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ABSTRACT
The United States is in the midst of a family planning crisis. Approximately half of
all pregnancies nationwide are unintended. In recognition of the social importance of
family planning, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) includes a “contraceptive mandate” that
requires insurers to cover contraception at no cost. Yet, a decade after its enactment, the
ACA’s promise of universal contraceptive access for insured women remains unfulfilled,
with as many as one-third of U.S. women unable to access their preferred contraceptive
without cost.
While much attention has been focused on religious exemptions granted to
employers, the primary barrier to no-cost contraception is the profit motivation of private
insurance companies. This Article fills a crucial gap by providing an in-depth examination
of the insurance practices that burden contraceptive access for the vast majority of
reproductive-aged women on both public and private insurance. Private insurers are
afforded substantial discretion in the products they choose to cover and the costs they set,
and this causes significant disparities in the availability and affordability of various
contraceptive methods. Arguments for equitable and enhanced contraceptive access are
traditionally grounded in claims of constitutional rights to reproductive freedom.
Unfortunately, this rhetoric of individual rights, rooted in privacy jurisprudence, focuses
only on restraining the state from interfering with a woman’s reproductive decisions. This
absolves the state of responsibility for family planning and allows women to shoulder the
burden of unintended pregnancy as a matter of individual choice and responsibility.
This Article instead applies vulnerability theory to establish state responsibility for
just and fair distribution of contraception. A vulnerability approach imposes positive
obligations on the state to provide contraception as a form of resilience, rather than
allowing the state to abdicate responsibility to the private insurance market and individual
women under a limited “consumer protection” role. This approach requires the state to
monitor and regulate the discretion afforded to insurance companies in making public
decisions regarding coverage of various contraceptive methods. This includes examining
inequitable insurance practices and policies and assessing power imbalances between
insurers, providers, and pharmaceutical companies and patients. In this manner, the
United States can move beyond its narrow consumer-oriented approach to contraception
and recognize that contraception is vital to fulfillment of important social obligations, not
an individual choice made by empowered consumers.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States is in the midst of a family planning crisis. For decades,
approximately half of all pregnancies in the nation have been unintended, despite almost
universal willingness among women to use contraception. 1 Meaningful access to
contraception is critical to improving public health and reducing poverty.2 In recognition
of the social importance of family planning, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) includes a
“contraceptive mandate” that requires insurers to cover contraception at no cost.3 A decade
99% of sexually active U.S. women between the ages of 19 and 44 have used contraception at some point
in their lives. Kimberly Daniels, William D. Mosher & Jo Jones, Contraceptive Methods Women Have Ever
Used: United States, 1982-2010, 62 NAT'L HEALTH STAT. REP. 1, 1 (2013),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr062.pdf.
2
See infra Part I.A.
3
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2018).
1
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after enactment, its promise of universal contraceptive access for insured women remains
unfulfilled. As many as one-third of U.S. women4 are not able to access their preferred
contraceptive without cost.5 Because of the powerful relationship between contraceptive
preference and efficacy, 6 public responsibility for family planning cannot be fulfilled
without granting access to a wide range of contraceptive options. Yet there are significant
disparities in the availability and affordability of various methods.
Much scholarly and political attention focuses on religious exemptions granted to
those employers who object to covering contraception. However, the primary reason U.S.
women cannot access no-cost contraception is, quite simply, the profit motivation of
private insurance companies. This Article fills a crucial gap by providing an in-depth
examination of the insurance practices that burden contraceptive access for the vast
majority of reproductive-aged women on both public and private insurance. 7 Public
responsibility for contraception did not have to be delegated to private for-profit
corporations. Through decades of legislation, the state8 essentially created the for-profit
health insurance industry and cemented the now-dominant model of managed care, which
pits cost considerations against health considerations in a battle that often favors insurers.
As a result, private insurers impose a number of restrictions on contraceptive access that
undermine public health goals. Women and their families are abandoned to the
marketplace, where they face the almost impossible tasks of choosing a health plan that
provides optimal contraceptive coverage, fighting a lonely battle against improper
insurance claim denials, and shouldering the extreme consequences of unintended
pregnancy when their ill-fated efforts to procure contraception ultimately fail.
Adoption of the contraceptive mandate was an important and necessary step in
realizing state responsibility for contraception. Unfortunately, the state has attempted to
fulfill its obligation by emphasizing individual marketplace choice and minimally
regulating insurers under the guise of individual consumer protection. This consumer
protection focus absolves the state of responsibility for family planning, placing the burden
of access and enforcement on individual women and their families while targeting only the
most flagrantly abusive behaviors of insurance companies. Traditional arguments for
equitable and enhanced contraceptive access, grounded in claims of individual rights and
choice and rooted in privacy jurisprudence, serve to reinforce this approach by focusing
only on restraining the state from interfering with a woman’s reproductive decisions.
This Article instead applies vulnerability theory to firmly establish state
responsibility for just and fair distribution of contraception. Vulnerability theory
“Women” is used throughout this article as a proxy term for all individuals who may become pregnant.
The arguments in this article apply with equal force to persons of all gender identities.
5
See infra Part I.C.
6
Id.
7
Approximately one in ten women in the U.S. remain uninsured and thus unable to access contraception
through insurance. While this is a significant inequity, it will not be the focus of this Article. See Women’s
Health Insurance Coverage, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (KFF) (Nov. 8, 2021) [hereinafter KFF, Women’s Health
Insurance Coverage], https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/fact-sheet/womens-health-insurancecoverage/.
8
This Article uses the term “the state” as used conceptually in political theory. While there is no single
definition of “the state,” it is used here to generally refer to a politically organized community living under
a single system of government. The term is not intended to represent a particular state of the union or
governance structure, though the federal government more closely aligns with a conception of the state
under vulnerability theory.
4
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recognizes that we are universally vulnerable by nature of our embodiment and envisions
a state that responds to its citizens' vulnerability by providing the resources needed for
resilience. 9 A vulnerability approach thus imposes positive obligations on the state to
provide contraception as a form of resilience, rather than allowing the state to abdicate
responsibility to individual women under a limited “consumer protection” role. The state
cannot simply delegate responsibility for implementation of the law to the private insurance
market without additional oversight. The state is obligated to closely monitor and regulate
the discretion afforded to insurance companies in making public decisions regarding
coverage of various contraceptive methods. Further, the state is obligated to act where
insurance companies are in clear violation of existing law. The delegation of public
contraceptive policy to private insurance companies also implicates concerns of democratic
accountability and transparency that must be addressed by the state. However, it is not
enough to simply increase enforcement or enact stricter regulation. Insurers’ institutional
vulnerabilities must be addressed if we continue to make them responsible for meeting
public goals.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of the social
importance of contraception and the current state of contraceptive access in the U.S. Part
II explores the history of managed care and its impact on contraceptive access. Part III
discusses the numerous burdens the state has imposed on individual women by abdicating
its family planning obligations to the marketplace. Part IV then concludes by applying
vulnerability theory to establish a better approach to state responsibility that obligates the
state to address profit-motivated barriers to contraceptive access.
I. THE STATE OF CONTRACEPTIVE ACCESS
There is significant social need for greater access to contraception in the U.S.,
particularly amid a global pandemic. For decades, the state has recognized the social
importance of family planning. Yet, a decade after enactment of the ACA’s contraceptive
mandate, its promise remains unfulfilled.
A. The Social Importance of Contraception
Despite both sides of the political aisle framing contraception as a private issue,10
9

See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject].
10
Some Republicans oppose public funding of contraception because they consider procreation and
contraception private matters. See, e.g., Haley claims women ‘don't care about contraception’, The Rachel
Maddow Show (Apr. 4, 2012, 9:32 AM EDT), https://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/haley-claimswomen-dont-care-about-con-msna32359 (quoting Republican governor Nikki Haley regarding
contraception: “All we’re saying is we don’t want government to mandate when we have to have it or when
we don’t.”); Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Trump health pick Seema Verma says maternity coverage should be
optional, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/health/ct-trump-healthpick-says-maternity-coverage-should-be-optional-20170216-story.html (discussing Trump appointee’s
testimony to Senate Finance Committee that women, not government, should choose maternity coverage).
Democrats often argue for full support of individual reproductive choice and respect for private decisions
made between women and their healthcare providers. See, e.g., FORA.tv, Rep. Tammy Duckworth Slams
GOP: ‘Stay Out of My Uterus,’ YOUTUBE (Jul. 29, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OWp588lkv0; Tom Joyce, Democrats Should Take Note on Andrew Yang’s Abortion Policy, WASH. EXAM’R (Apr. 12,
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there are undoubtedly few things more public. The shockingly high unintended pregnancy
rate in the U.S. poses a significant public health crisis. Almost half of all pregnancies in
the U.S. are unintended, a figure that has held relatively steady for decades.11 The rate of
unintended pregnancy in the U.S. substantially exceeds that of many other developed
countries.12 This is cause for concern, especially when coupled with our extremely high
rate of maternal mortality relative to other developed nations.13
Unintended pregnancy imposes significant physical, social, and financial costs on
women, their families, and our society as a whole. Unintended pregnancy is associated with
poor health outcomes for women, including maternal mortality, increased pregnancy
complications, perinatal depression, and increased rates of physical abuse.14 Unintended
pregnancy impacts children as well. Short spacing between births increases the risk of
premature birth and low birth weight.15 Unplanned births are associated with delayed and
less frequent prenatal care visits, decreased likelihood of breastfeeding, and shorter
duration of breastfeeding. 16 Unintended pregnancy especially harms teens. Teenage
mothers drop out of high school at alarming rates, often beginning an inter-generational
cycle of teenage pregnancy and poverty.17 Additionally, unintended pregnancy imposes a
significant financial burden on the public. The Brookings Institute has estimated that the
public pays an average of $11 billion annually for the medical costs and infant expenses
associated with unplanned pregnancy.18
Contraception plays a pivotal role in addressing this family planning crisis. There is
little doubt that correct and consistent usage of contraception prevents unintended
pregnancy. Indeed, 95% of all unintended pregnancies result from not using contraception
or using it inconsistently. 19 A recent study correlated a global decrease in unintended
2021), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/democrats-should-take-notes-on-andrew-yangsabortion-policy (reporting former City Council Speaker’s statement that “I have sole authority in all that
pertains to my body INCLUDING choosing NOT to have children.”).
11
Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. 1, 2 (Jan. 2019),
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/fb-unintended-pregnancy-us.pdf.
12
Id.
13
The maternal mortality rate (MMR) in the U.S. is higher than most developed countries, with 19 out of
every 100,000 mothers dying from pregnancy and childbirth complications. WORLD HEALTH ORG., TRENDS
IN MATERNAL MORTALITY 2000 TO 2017: ESTIMATES BY WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, WORLD BANK GROUP AND
THE U. N. POPULATION DIV., EXEC. SUMMARY 1, 11 (2019),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/327596/WHO-RHR-19.23eng.pdf?sequence=13&isAllowed=y.
14
See Naomi Cahn, Contraception Matters: Rights, Class and Context Symposium Keynote, 24 WASH. &
LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 529, 541, 547–48 (2018) (noting that unintended birth is associated with both
perinatal depression and increased rates of domestic violence); Agustin Conde-Agudelo, Anyeli RosasBermúdez & Ana Cecelia Kafury-Goeta, Birth Spacing and Risk of Adverse Perinatal Outcomes: A MetaAnalysis, 295 JAMA 1809, 1809 (2006) (finding pregnancy complications and poor neonatal outcomes
increase with shorter intervals between pregnancy).
15
Conde-Agudelo, Rosas-Bermúdez & Kafury-Goeta, supra note 14.
16
Cahn, supra note 14, at 541.
17
Id. at 556 (discussing study indicating that teenage girls are twice as likely to finish high school if they
do not give birth and children of teenage mothers are more likely to become teenage mothers and face
unemployment).
18
Emily Monea & Adam Thomas, Unintended Pregnancy and Taxpayer Spending, 43 PERSP. SEXUAL &
REPROD. HEALTH 88, 88 (2011).
19
Adam Sonfield, Kinsey Hasstedt & Rachel Benson Gold, Moving Forward: Family Planning in the Era
of Health Reform, GUTTMACHER INST. 4, 9 (2014),
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pregnancies with increased access to contraception. 20 Additionally, studies have
demonstrated that access to contraception significantly reduces child and adult poverty
rates.21 The ability to better plan pregnancies gives families the resources necessary to
invest in career and education, which ultimately benefits society.22 Contraception use also
reduces abortion rates. Multiple studies have demonstrated that access to free
contraception, particularly long-acting reversible contraception (LARC), significantly
lowers the rate of unintended pregnancies and abortions.23
The COVID-19 pandemic heightens the social importance of contraception. The
pandemic and resulting economic recession may increase demand for contraception, as
more families seek to delay or avoid pregnancy due to financial constraints.24 In a recent
survey, more than one-third of women reported a desire to delay pregnancy or have fewer
children because of the pandemic.25 At the same time, the pandemic has created additional
barriers to contraceptive access. The United Nations Population Fund has estimated that
over 50 million women globally could lose access to contraception during the pandemic,
resulting in up to 15 million unintended pregnancies.26 The social consequences of such an
increase, particularly at a time when the pandemic imposes an enormous strain on resources
and significant threats to maternal health,27 could be devastating. Against this backdrop,
there should be little doubt that unintended pregnancy is a public health issue that requires
a social solution. Equitable and widespread access to contraception is a key component of
that solution.

https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/family-planning-and-health-reform.pdf.
20
Jonathan Bearak, Anna Popinchalk, Bela Ganatra, Ann-Beth Moller, Özge Tunçalp, Cynthia Beavin &
Leontine Alkema, Unintended Pregnancy and Abortion by Income, Region, and the Legal Status of
Abortion: Estimates From a Comprehensive Model for 1990–2019, 8 THE LANCET GLOB. HEALTH 1152,
1152 (2020).
21
Cahn, supra note 14, at 537.
22
Mary Tschann & Reni Soon, Contraceptive Coverage and the Affordable Care Act, 42 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY CLINICS N. AM. 605, 606 (2015).
23
See Cahn, supra note 14, at 558–59 (discussing studies in Colorado and St. Louis associating increased
access to long acting reversible contraceptives (LARC) with significant reductions in abortion rates,
approximately five times lower than national averages in St. Louis and 34% lower in Colorado); Karen
Mulligan, Contraception Use, Abortions, and Births: The Effect of Insurance Mandates, 52 DEMOGRAPHY
1195, 1195 (2015) (predicting 25,000 fewer abortions annually because of ACA contraceptive mandate).
24
Issue Brief: Access To Contraceptives During The COVID-19 Pandemic And Recession, NAT’L
WOMEN’S LAW CTR. 1, 2–3 (Jul. 2020), https://nwlc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/NWLCIssueBrief_BCandCOVID-19.pdf [hereinafter NWLC, COVID Issue
Brief].
25
Laura D. Lindberg, Alicia VandeVusse, Jennifer Mueller & Marielle Kirstein, Early Impacts of the
COVID-19 Pandemic: Findings from the 2020 Guttmacher Survey of Reproductive Health Experiences,
GUTTMACHER INST. 3, 4–5 (Jun. 2020), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/earlyimpacts-covid-19-pandemic-findings-2020-guttmacher-survey-reproductive-health.pdf.
26
U. N. FUND FOR POPULATION ACTIVITIES, IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON FAM. PLANNING AND
ENDING GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION AND CHILD MARRIAGE 3 (Apr. 27,
2020), https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/COVID19_impact_brief_for_UNFPA_24_April_2020_1.pdf.
27
Hospital restrictions and resource constraints resulting from the pandemic have negatively impacted birth
experiences and maternal health in several ways. See Jennifer Hickey, Nature is Smarter Than We Are:
Midwifery and the Responsive State, 40 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 245, 300–05 (2021).
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B. State Recognition
For decades, the state has acknowledged the social importance of contraception and
accepted at least a limited responsibility for its provision. Currently, the government
facilitates access to contraception through a patchwork of state and federal laws and
programs that vary depending on insurance status.
Uninsured women may access contraception through federally funded “Title X”
clinics. Title X is a federal grant program established in 1970 to provide affordable
contraceptive and sexual wellness care, particularly to those with low incomes, regardless
of health insurance status. 28 In establishing Title X, Congress recognized explicitly the
pivotal role that contraception plays in improving the physical and financial health of
families and addressing the harm of unfettered population growth.29 Ideally, Title X clinics
would primarily serve women without access to insurance. Unfortunately, uninsured
patients now comprise less than half of those utilizing Title X clinics.30 This is due in large
part to chronic underfunding,31 which forces clinics to prioritize insured patients because
they will be reimbursed for care. Ongoing political attacks also threaten the security of the
Title X program.32 As a result, those least equipped to handle an unplanned pregnancy face
significant barriers to contraceptive access.
The vast majority of U.S. women access contraception through Medicaid and private
insurance.33 Since 1972, no-cost family planning benefits have been a mandatory part of
the joint federal-state Medicaid program, though states vary in the types of services and
contraceptive methods that they provide.34 Private insurers are subject to the Affordable
Care Act’s (ACA) “contraceptive mandate,” which requires them to cover contraception
and related counseling and other services at no out-of-pocket cost.35 Federal guidance has
clarified that the mandate requires insurers to cover “at least one form of contraception in
each of the methods (currently eighteen) that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has

28

INST. OF MED., A REVIEW OF THE HHS FAM. PLANNING PROGRAM: MISSION, MGMT., AND
MEASUREMENT OF RESULTS 71–72 (Butler A. Sith & Clayton E. Wright eds., 2009).
29
Id. at 22–23.
30
Christina Fowler, Julia Gable, Beth Lasater & Kat Asman, Family Planning Annual Report: 2019
National Summary, OFF. OF POPULATION AFFAIRS, OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HEALTH, DEP’T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES A-18 (Sept. 2020), https://opa.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/title-xfpar-2019-national-summary.pdf (reporting 41% of Title X patients were uninsured in 2019).
31
INST. OF MED., supra note 28, at 10–11.
32
NWLC, COVID Issue Brief, supra note 24, at 3 (discussing the impact of Trump administration
regulations on Title X clinics, including “slashing the Title X program’s capacity by at least 46% nationally,
and up to 100% in some states”).
33
A significant majority (69%) of the 97.3 million U.S. women aged 19-64 are privately insured, 11% are
uninsured, and 17% are on Medicaid (public insurance). KFF, Women’s Health Insurance Coverage, supra
note 7.
34
Adam Sonfield, A Fragmented System: Ensuring Comprehensive Contraceptive
Coverage in All U.S. Health Insurance Plans, 24 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 1, 3 (2021) [hereinafter
Sonfield, Fragmented System], https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/ouractivities/resource-center/faqs/aca-part-xxvi.pdf.
35
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2018) (requiring most group and individual health insurance plans to cover
women’s preventive services “provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources
and Services Administration” without cost-sharing).
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identified for women in its current Birth Control Guide” without cost sharing. 36 The
mandate applies to all commercial group and individual health insurance plans, excepting
those plans that were “grandfathered” in at the time of ACA implementation. 37 The
mandate also applies to plans offered to state and federal government employees 38 and
Medicaid recipients who were made eligible by ACA’s expansion of Medicaid to those
with incomes at or below 138% of the federal poverty level.39 Additionally, twenty-nine
states and the District of Columbia have their own contraceptive mandates for private
insurers, many of them implemented long before the ACA.40
The ACA recognized the importance of providing no-cost coverage of a wide array
of contraceptive methods. Prior to its implementation, numerous studies confirmed that
cost was a major barrier to contraceptive access. 41 To address this, the Department of
Health and Human Services adopted the recommendation of the Institute of Medicine
(IOM) that the ACA cover without cost “the full range of FDA-approved contraceptive
methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for women with
reproductive capacity.” 42 The IOM recommendations emphasized that even small costs
have been shown to prevent use of contraception.43 Thus, “[t]he elimination of cost sharing
for contraception therefore could greatly increase its use, including use of the more
effective and longer-acting methods, especially among poor and low-income women most
at risk for unintended pregnancy.”44
FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation (Part XXVI), DEP’TS OF LAB., HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., & TREASURY at 4 (May 11, 2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/ouractivities/resource-center/faqs/aca-part-xxvi.pdf; Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH RES. &
SERV. ADMIN. (2019), https://www.hrsa.gov/womens-guidelines-2019.
37
A grandfathered health plan is one that has been in place since enactment of the ACA in 2010 and not
undergone significant change. 45 C.F.R. § 147.140f.
38
State and local government employee plans are subject to the contraceptive mandate. See Public Health
Service Act § 2723(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(b)(1)(B). The mandate does not apply directly to the
Federal Employees Health Benefits program, but the Office of Personnel Management has directed that all
plans comply with the ACA. OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT., FEHB PROGRAM CARRIER LETTER NO. 2021-02
11; OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT., FEHB PROGRAM CARRIER LETTER NO. 2019-01 6.
39
Sonfield, Fragmented System, supra note 34, at 3.
40
Id. at 2.
41
See Jonathan M. Bearak & Rachel K. Jones, Did Contraceptive Use Patterns Change after the Affordable
Care Act? A Descriptive Analysis, 27 WOMEN'S HEALTH ISSUES 316, 316 (2017) (collecting the “sizeable
literature in the United States” that “suggests that making prescription contraceptives available at no cost
leads to increases in contraceptive use”); Cahn, supra note 14, at 550–51 (discussing 2010 (pre-ACA)
survey finding that “more than one-third of female voters had struggled to afford prescription birth control
at some point in their lives and, as a result, had used birth control inconsistently. At that point, birth control
payments constituted approximately 30-44% total out-of-pocket expenses for health care”); COMM. ON
HEALTH CARE FOR UNDERSERVED WOMEN, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, COMM. OP. NO. 615:
ACCESS TO CONTRACEPTION, 125 OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY, 250, 252 (Jan. 2015) [hereinafter ACOG,
Access to Contraception] (finding “[h]igh out-of-pocket costs, deductibles, and copayments for
contraception also limit contraceptive access even for those with private health insurance”); Jane Broecker,
Joan Jurich & Robin Fuchs, The relationship between long-acting reversible contraception and insurance
coverage: a retrospective analysis, 93 CONTRACEPTION 266, 270 (2016) (finding that cost was a
“significant barrier” to LARC placement for privately insured women utilizing an Appalachian private
practice prior to implementation of the ACA and might “remain a barrier for privately insured women who
are required to pay some or all of the cost of LARC methods”).
42
INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN 108–09 (2011).
43
Id.
44
Id.
36
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In many ways, the ACA’s contraceptive mandate has been a tremendous success.
Studies suggest that the ACA has significantly improved access to affordable contraception
for privately insured women. Several studies show a substantial reduction in out-of-pocket
costs.45 Other studies confirm an increase in contraceptive use attributed to the ACA, in
particular the use of more effective long-term methods.46 These findings are supported by
studies suggesting that state contraceptive mandates increase contraceptive usage as well.47
Recent studies suggest that the contraceptive mandate may be responsible for a decline in
unintended pregnancies, particularly among low-income women newly eligible for
Medicaid. 48 Additionally, studies have shown that the ACA’s extension of “dependent
coverage” to those up to age twenty-six has resulted in decreased fertility among young
See Amy Law, L. Wen, J. Lin, M. Tangirala, J.S. Schwartz & E. Zampaglione, Are women benefiting from
the Affordable Care Act? A real-world evaluation of the impact of the Affordable Care Act on out-of-pocket
costs for contraceptives, 93 CONTRACEPTION 392 (2016) (finding that mean total out-of-pocket expenses
for FDA-approved contraceptives decreased approximately 70% from 2011 to 2013 among 2.5 million
privately insured women and concluding that “[i]mplementation of the ACA has saved women a substantial
amount in out-of-pocket expenses for contraceptives”); Nora V. Becker, The Impact of Insurance Coverage
on Utilization of Prescription Contraceptives: Evidence from the Affordable Care Act, 37 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS AND MGMT. 571 (2018) (analyzing claims data of a large national insurer to find a substantial
decrease in out-of-pocket costs of prescription contraceptives following implementation of the ACA);
Jonathan M. Bearak, Lawrence B. Finer, Jenna Jerman & Megan L. Kavanaugh, Changes in out-of-pocket
costs for hormonal IUDs after implementation of the Affordable Care Act: an analysis of insurance benefit
inquiries, 93 CONTRACEPTION 139 (2016) (finding that the percentage of privately insured women required
to pay out-of-pocket costs for IUDs dropped from 58% in January 2012 (pre-ACA) to 13% in March 2014);
Laurie Sobel, Adara Beamesderfer & Alina Salganicoff, Private Insurance Coverage of Contraception,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 2016), https://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-private-insurance-coverageof-contraception (“Since the implementation of the ACA’s contraceptive coverage provision, fewer women
are paying out of pocket for contraceptives. For example, the share of reproductive age women
experiencing out-of-pocket spending on oral contraceptive pills declined from 20.9% in 2012 to 3.6% in
2014. This decline accounts for nearly two-thirds (63%) of the drop in out-of-pocket spending on retail
drugs during this time period.”).
46
See Becker, supra note 5 (documenting two studies finding increased usage of contraception after
implementation of the ACA and similarly finding “increased use of contraception overall among privately
insured women in the United States” and “especially large increases in new use of long-term, more
effective methods of birth control,” estimating a 2.95% increase in total contraception use among this
population); The Affordable Care Act’s Birth Control Benefit: Too Important to Lose, NAT’L WOMEN’S L.
CTR. 1 (Jun. 2018) (“Data on prescription drug use in 2013, after the birth control benefit went into effect,
indicate a nearly five percent uptick in filled birth control pill prescriptions. Express Scripts, one of the
nation’s largest pharmacy benefit management companies, attributed this increase to the birth control
benefit fulfilling a previously unmet need.”).
47
See Danielle N. Atkins & W. David Bradford, Changes in State Prescription Contraceptive Mandates for
Insurers, 46 PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 23 (2014) (finding that state contraceptive mandates
increased overall usage of prescription contraceptives by 5% among privately insured women).
48
Vanessa K. Dalton, Michelle H. Moniz, Martha J. Bailey, Lindsay K. Admon, Giselle E. Kolenic, Anca
Tilea & A. Mark Fendrick, Trends in Birth Rates After Elimination of Cost Sharing for Contraception by
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 3 JAMA NETWORK OPEN 11 (2020) (finding decrease in
births in all income groups after implementation of the ACA, most significantly among women in the
lowest income group, where estimated probability of birth decreased by 22% from 2014 to 2018,
suggesting that “contraception insurance coverage without consumer cost sharing may be associated with
decreased income-related disparities in unintended pregnancies”); Colleen L. MacCallum-Bridges & Claire
E. Margerison, The Affordable Care Act Contraception Mandate & Unintended Pregnancy in Women of
Reproductive Age: An Analysis of the National Survey of Family Growth, 2008–2010 v. 2013–2015, 101
CONTRACEPTION 34 (2020) (finding “a significant 37% decrease in the odds of unintended pregnancy for
women with government-sponsored insurance” in the two years following implementation of the ACA).
45
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adults, possibly due to improved access to contraceptives.49 Further, a large majority of
Americans support the contraceptive mandate or other laws requiring private insurers to
fully cover contraception.50 In sum, the ACA’s contraceptive mandate has undoubtedly
improved access to contraception.
C. A Promise Unfulfilled
Despite the tremendous gains of the ACA, significant barriers to contraceptive access
remain. It is not enough simply to provide no-cost access to only some forms of
contraception. Research shows that women are more likely to use contraception effectively
and consistently when they can use their method of choice. 51 Medical experts have
repeatedly recognized the importance of access to preferred contraception. 52 American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) has stated that “in the absence of
contraindications, patient choice should be the principal factor in prescribing one method
of contraception over another.”53 In its recommendations regarding the ACA, the IOM
noted that access to a wider range of contraceptives was imperative for increasing
consistent and correct usage and correspondingly reducing the rate of unintended
pregnancy.54
Unfortunately, many publicly and privately insured women are still unable to access
their preferred contraceptive. Cost still seems to be a significant barrier, despite the ACA’s
promise of no-cost contraception. Insured women may be forced to pay for contraception
because they are enrolled in one of a small percentage (13%) of legacy plans that are
exempt from the ACA.55 Some may be on a plan that does not offer contraception due to
Joelle Abramowitz, Planning Parenthood: The Affordable Care Act Young Adult Provision and Pathways
to Fertility, 31 J. POPULATION ECON. 1097 (2018) (finding association between the ACA young adult
provision and both decreased likelihood of birth and abortion and increased likelihood of long-term
hormonal contraceptive use); Bradley Heim, Ithai Lurie & Kosali I. Simon, The Impact of the Affordable
Care Act Young Adult Provision on Childbearing, Marriage, and Tax Filing Behavior: Evidence from Tax
Data 16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch. Working Paper No. 23092, 2017),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w23092/w23092.pdf (finding reduction in fertility
among unmarried young adults after implementation of the ACA, possibly due to increased access to
contraception); Jennifer Trudeau & Karen S. Conway, The Effects of Young Adult-Dependent Coverage and
Contraception Mandates on Young Women, 36 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 73 (2018) (finding decreased
fertility among young women associated with ACA’s dependent-coverage and contraceptive mandates).
50
A 2015 study found that over 77% of women and 64% of men support laws requiring insurers to fully
cover the cost of birth control. Laurie Sobel, Alina Salganicoff & Caroline Rosenzweig, The Future of
Contraceptive Coverage, KFF (Jan. 9, 2017), http://kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/the-future-ofcontraceptive-coverage. See also Contraceptives + Policy Through a Gender Lens, Results from a National
Survey Conducted by PerryUndem, PERRYUNDEM RSCH./COMMC’N 1, 17 (Mar. 2017),
https://www.scribd.com/document/342699692/PerryUndem-Gender-and-Birth-Control-Access-Report
(finding that over 77% of women want continuation of the ACA’s contraceptive mandate).
51
Caroline Moreau, Jean Bouyer, Fabien Gilbert, The COCON Group & Nathalie Bajos, Social,
Demographic and Situational Characteristics Associated with Inconsistent Use of Oral Contraceptives:
Evidence from France, 38 PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 190 (2006); J. Noone, Finding the Best Fit:
A Grounded Theory of Contraceptive Decision Making in Women, 39 NURSING F. 13 (2004).
52
See, e.g., AMERICAN COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, GUIDELINES FOR WOMEN’S HEALTH
CARE: A RES. MANUAL 183 (3d ed. 2007); INST. OF MED., supra note 42, at 108–09.
53
AMERICAN COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, supra note 52, at 183.
54
INST. OF MED., supra note 42, at 108–09.
55
2019 Employer Health Benefits Survey, KFF (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.kff.org/report-section/ehbs49
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their employer’s religious or moral objections. The ACA has long exempted churches and
some religious nonprofits from the contraceptive mandate. 56 Recent Supreme Court
decisions and regulations promulgated by the Trump administration have expanded the
availability of the religious or moral objection exemption to any employer other than a
publicly traded corporation.57 The government estimated that these new exemptions would
affect between 31,700 and 120,000 women,58 less than 1% of the 64.3 million women who
currently have private insurance coverage subject to the contraceptive mandate.59
Studies suggest that the number of insured women facing cost barriers far exceeds
the small number subject to legacy insurance plans or religious exemptions. A recent
women’s health survey conducted in 2020 by the Kaiser Family Foundation found that one
in five women (18%) are not using their preferred method of contraception and 25% of
these women cited cost as the reason.60 Numerous studies confirm that a large percentage
of insured women, as many as one-third, are still paying out-of-pocket for contraception
after enactment of the ACA61 and these costs preclude them from accessing their preferred
method.62 For example, one study found that, of the 33% of insured women paying some
2019-section-1-cost-of-health-insurance/.
56
See Laurie Sobel, Alina Salganicoff & Caroline Rosenzweig, New Regulations Broadening Employer
Exemptions to Contraceptive Coverage: Impact on Women, KFF (Nov. 2018),
https://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-New-Regulations-Broadening-Employer-Exemptions-toContraceptive-Coverage-Impact-on-Women (discussing regulations issued by the Trump administration in
2018 and the Supreme Court cases brought by religious employers challenging the contraceptive mandate,
Zubik v. Burwell and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby).
57
Id. at 1.
58
Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the
Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47821, 47823–24 (2017).
59
KFF, Women’s Health Insurance Coverage, supra note 7.
60
Brittni Frederiksen, Usha Ranji, Alina Salganicoff & Michelle Long, Women's Sexual and Reproductive
Health Services: Key Findings from the 2020 KFF Women's Health Survey, KFF (Apr. 21, 2021)
[hereinafter Frederiksen et al., Women's Sexual and Reproductive Health Services],
https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/womens-sexual-and-reproductive-health-serviceskey-findings-from-the-2020-kff-womens-health-survey/.
61
See Bearak & Jones, supra note 41, at 319 (finding that about one-third of insured women in 2015 study
had a copayment for prescription contraceptives); Adam Sonfield, Athena Tapales, Rachel K. Jones &
Lawrence B. Finer, Impact of the Federal Contraceptive Coverage Guarantee on Out-of-Pocket
Payments for Contraceptives: 2014 Update, 91 CONTRACEPTION 44 (2015) (finding that approximately
33% of privately insured women in national survey paid some out-of-pocket costs for oral contraceptives);
Emily M. Johnston, Brigette Courtot & Genevieve M. Kenney, Access to Contraception in 2016 and What
It Means to Women, URB. INST. (Jan. 2017),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/87691/2001113-access-to-contraception-in-2016-andwhat-it-means-to-women.pdf (finding just under one-third (31.4%) of women at risk of unplanned
pregnancy (uninsured and insured) paid some out-of-pocket cost for prescription birth control); Law, Wen,
Lin, Tangirala, Schwartz & Zampaglione, supra note 45, at 395 (finding that approximately 30% of
commercially insured women still have cost-sharing for contraceptives after enactment of the ACA). Note:
these studies were conducted before or shortly after the FDA adopted the “category rule” to clarify that
insurers must cover one method of contraception from each of the FDA-approved birth control categories
without cost-sharing. Implementation of this rule likely did have some effect on cost-sharing. However, a
very recent study found that twenty-one percent of privately insured women still paid some out-of-pocket
costs for birth control in 2020. Frederiksen et al., Women's Sexual and Reproductive Health Services, supra
note 60.
62
See Kristen L. Burke, Joseph E. Potter & Kari White, Unsatisfied Contraceptive Preferences Due to Cost
Among Women in the United States, 2 CONTRACEPTION: X 1 (2020) (finding that 22% of a large nationally
representative sample of women at risk for unplanned pregnancy would use a different method of
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amount for prescription contraception, “40% agreed that [eliminating] the copayment
[would] help them to afford and use birth control, 32% agreed this would help them choose
a better method, and 30% agreed this would help them to contracept consistently.”63 The
COVID-19 pandemic has only exacerbated the situation. In a recent survey, 27% of women
reported increased concern that they could not afford contraception during the pandemic.64
The primary reason women cannot access no-cost contraception is the profit
motivation of insurance companies. As detailed in the next Part, insurers employ several
profit-generating techniques, many of them technically legal, that create significant barriers
to contraceptive access. While cost is the primary roadblock, private insurers are
responsible for many other barriers related to the accessibility and availability of
contraception. These restrictions impact public insurance as well due to the significant
involvement of private insurers in Medicaid. As a result, the vast majority of U.S. women
are subject to numerous constraints on contraceptive access that contravene public health
goals and undermine the social importance of family planning.
II. THE BUSINESS OF FAMILY PLANNING
Private insurers have become the gatekeepers to affordable contraception. This Part
explains how the state allows and even encourages private insurers to limit contraceptive
access in order to maximize their profits. It was not inevitable that private for-profit
corporations should fulfill public responsibility for contraception. However, the rise of the
private health insurance industry and the advent of managed care cemented the role of
private insurers in health care delivery. As a result, contraception is distributed in
accordance with standard business principles of profit and efficiency, allowing only a
narrow consideration of individual medical need.
A. The Rise of Managed Care
To understand the privatization of contraception, it is necessary first to examine the
history of health insurance in the United States. The market-based approach to the
financing of health care, which necessarily involves trade-offs between cost and health, is
now “simply dominant in policymaking in the United States.” 65 However, for-profit
insurers and employers have not always acted as mediating institutions in health care
provision. History shows that the state, perhaps inadvertently, essentially created the forprofit health insurance industry and has cemented its dominant role in the fulfillment of
public health goals, including family planning.
Private health insurance in the U.S. was born less than a century ago. During the
Great Depression, economic instability rendered patients unable to seek health care from
newly burgeoning hospitals and medical centers. 66 In response, the American Hospital
Association and other physician associations created private health insurance for individual
contraception if cost was not a concern).
63
Bearak & Jones, supra note 41, at 316.
64
Lindberg, VandeVusse, Mueller & Kirstein, supra note 25, at 5.
65
Matthew B. Lawrence, The Social Consequences Problem in Health Insurance and How To Solve It, 13
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 593, 621 (2019).
66
Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insurance in the United States: A Proposal for a More Functional
System, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 7–8 (2005).
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patients: first, the Blue Cross plan which covered hospitalization and later, the Blue Shield
plans to cover non-hospital medical expenses.67 Importantly, these “Blue” plans were nonprofit.68
The pervasive union of employment and health insurance also came about fairly
recently. After World War II, government-enacted wage and price freezes caused
employers to begin offering health insurance plans to attract employees. 69 While this may
have been an “accidental” result of government policy, it gained support as an alternative
to the national public health insurance scheme being debated at the time.70 Further, this
employer sponsorship model was codified in 1954 with the development of tax exemptions
for employer contributions to health insurance plans.71
As employer-sponsored insurance rapidly gained popularity, new insurance
companies formed to supply the necessary coverage.72 Many of these for-profit insurance
companies had a competitive advantage over the Blues because they were able to minimize
risk by offering lower premiums (the amount individuals pay for an insurance policy) to
healthier groups through the use of “experience rating,” which ties an individual’s premium
amount to the likelihood that the individual or her group will need medical care. 73 In
contrast, the nonprofit Blues used “community rating,” which ensures that all individuals
in the same geographic area pay the same premium regardless of their health status. 74 As
commercial entities moved to insure the healthiest groups, the Blues were forced to raise
premiums to account for the increased “risk” of insuring less-healthy individuals. 75
Ultimately, the Blues in most states were forced to convert to for-profit entities and adopt
experience rating to remain solvent. 76 Thus, health insurance shifted from a voluntary,
nonprofit “community service” model that functioned as social insurance by redistributing
costs from high- to low- risk groups, to a competitive, for-profit model that focuses on not
“penalizing” healthy people with higher costs, conflating equity with the “logic of
competition.”77
By the early 1970s, the health insurance industry was seemingly in crisis.78 At the
time, health insurers reimbursed patients for medical costs almost without question on a
fee-for-service basis.79 Thus, physicians and patients had little incentive to control costs.80
As technology advanced and expenses accumulated at “alarmingly rapid” rates, insurance
companies struggled to pay the costs and threatened to buckle under the strain. 81 In
response, the state acted to usher in the now-dominant system of managed care by passing
Id.
Id. at 9.
69
Id. at 10.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 11.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
PAUL STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MED. 329–30 (1982).
78
Jennifer M. Jendusa, The Denial of Benefits Quandary and Managed Care: McGraw v. Prudential
Insurance Company, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 115, 121 (1999).
79
Id. at 120–21.
80
Id. at 121.
81
Id.
67
68
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the Health Maintenance Organization Act in 1973. The Act propelled managed care into
“the mainstream insurance industry,” primarily by offering funding and support to
Managed Care Organizations (MCOs).82
MCOs are concerned foremost with cost containment. 83 They are structured via
contractual relationships with health care providers to control costs by offering patients a
limited number of providers from which to choose.84 Additionally, they employ a number
of techniques often referred to as “utilization management” to monitor patient care in an
attempt to control costs. 85 For example, MCOs commonly require physicians to seek
approval prior to administering a particular treatment, a technique known as prior
authorization.86 Managed care has been rightfully criticized for commercializing medicine
by forcing physicians to consider costs in treatment and denying necessary care to patients
to maximize profits.87
Regardless, managed care rose to dominance after the 1973 adoption of the Health
Maintenance Organization Act. MCOs grew in number throughout the 1980s88 and began
to dominate the market by the mid-nineties.89 By the late 1990s, 85% of insured employees
were on managed care plans instead of fee-for-service.90 By 2003, that number had risen
to 95%.91
While helping to usher managed care into the private insurance market, the state also
gave it a prominent role in public insurance. In 1965, the government created Medicare
and Medicaid to provide insurance for groups with traditionally limited access to employersponsored health plans.92 Medicare and Medicaid were originally based on the same feefor-service model established by the nonprofit Blues. 93 However, as health care costs
escalated, for-profit insurers increasingly obtained contractor positions to administer these
plans.94 Now, managed care is the dominant model for Medicaid delivery. In 2018, 69%
of total state Medicaid enrollees were on managed care plans.95 As early as 2011, 77% of

Id. at 121; Janet L. Dolgin, Unhealthy Determinations: Controlling “Medical Necessity”, 22 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 435, 464 (2015).
83
Jendusa, supra note 78, at 122–23.
84
Id.
85
See John P. Little, Managed Care Contracts of Adhesion: Terminating the Doctor-Patient Relationship
and Endangering Patient Health, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1397, 1407–10 (1997).
86
Id.
87
Jendusa, supra note 78, at 116, 120 (noting that MCOs have “come under increased scrutiny for denying
coverage to claims that would provide necessary treatment to an ailing patient” and discussing the historical
concerns of doctors and medical associations that insurers would make medical decisions in their own
interests and not those of the patients); Dolgin, supra note 82, at 445 (“The industry’s economic motives
can privilege considerations about cost over those about quality of care”); Hermer, supra note 66, at 23
(discussing physician opposition to managed care).
88
Dolgin, supra note 82, at 464.
89
Hermer, supra note 66, at 15.
90
Christine Gorman, Playing the HMO Game, TIME, Jul. 13, 1993, at 23.
91
Hermer, supra note 66, at 26 n.186.
92
Id. at 13.
93
Id. at 13–14.
94
See id. (discussing the rise in health care costs); Dolgin, supra note 82, at 454–55 (detailing the
involvement of for-profit insurers in Medicare claims administration).
95
Total Medicaid MCO Enrollment, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/totalmedicaid-mco-enrollment/ (last visited Jul. 9, 2021).
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reproductive age women enrolled in Medicaid were on managed care plans.96
The ACA further cemented cost-containing private insurance as the means of
financing public health care. While political opposition largely disallowed serious
consideration of a universal public health care system, it was not inevitable that the ACA
would leave intact the dominant role of private insurers. By focusing predominantly on
expanding access to insurance while regulating against only the “worst abuses perpetrated
by insurance companies on consumers,”97 the ACA continued the tradition of conflating
access to quality health care with market-based access to health insurance. As a result, “the
vast majority of all Americans experience rationing of their health care, despite the fact
that we have a private, ostensibly ‘choice’-based, system.”98
While dramatically escalating health care costs did necessitate state response, it is
not at all clear that enlisting for-profit insurers as cost-containment gatekeepers was the
appropriate move. Scholars have questioned whether traditional corporations, obligated by
law to maximize shareholder value as their primary objective, could ever effectively meet
public health needs. 99 It is particularly hard to reconcile increasingly poor healthcare
outcomes in the U.S. with the record profit growth enjoyed by companies in the healthcare
industry, including insurers.100 Nonetheless, private insurers are now deeply rooted in our
health care system and have been tasked with fulfillment of a number of public health
goals, including distribution of contraception.
B. Managed Care Burdens Access to Contraception
As a result of the state coupling contraceptive provision to managed care, insurance
cost-containment techniques routinely threaten access to contraception. Health insurance
companies and Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs), collectively “insurers,” use a number
of techniques to control the cost of prescription drugs, including contraception. PBMs
manage the prescription benefits for over 90% of covered Americans. 101 They are
essentially middlemen that negotiate drug sales and reimbursement between health
insurance plans, drug manufacturers, and pharmacies. 102 Health insurance companies
either contract with PBMs or have their own PBM operations in-house.103 Thus, PBMs
play a large role in restricting access to prescription contraceptives through cost-cutting
measures.
The ACA explicitly allows insurers to use these utilization management techniques
to determine the quantity and method of contraception covered, but only within each of the

Usha Ranji, Yali Bair & Alina Salganicoff, Medicaid and Family Planning: Background and
Implications of the ACA, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 5 (Feb. 3, 2016), https://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-briefmedicaid-and-family-planning-background-and-implications-of-the-aca.
97
Mariah McGill, The Struggle to Achieve the Human Right to Health Care in the United States, 25 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L. J. 625, 630 (2016).
98
Hermer, supra note 66, at 30.
99
See generally Yaniv Heled, Liza Vertinsky & Cass Brewer, Why Healthcare Companies Should Be(come)
Benefit Corporations, 60 B.C. L. REV. 73 (2019).
100
Id. at 75.
101
Joanna Shepherd, Pharmacy Benefit Managers, Rebates, and Drug Prices: Conflicts of Interest in the
Market for Prescription Drugs, 38 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 360, 361 (2019).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 364.
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FDA-defined method categories.104 This means, for example, if a woman was prescribed a
vaginal contraceptive ring, the insurer may seek to employ any of the cost-containment
measures described below to restrict coverage to certain brands of vaginal ring but could
not require that the woman use oral contraceptives instead. Nonetheless, utilization
management techniques can still delay or restrict access to contraception in a number of
ways, contravening public family planning goals.
Recognizing that “[utilization] management techniques such as denials, step therapy,
or prior authorization in public and private health care coverage can impede access to the
most effective contraceptive methods,” 105 nine states and D.C. have adopted laws
prohibiting insurers from imposing “restrictions or delays” on contraceptive coverage.106
However, some of these laws still allow the usage of utilization management techniques in
certain circumstances. 107 New York’s Comprehensive Contraceptive Coverage Act,
enacted in 2019, is one of the most expansive state laws, requiring no-cost coverage of
virtually all contraceptives, ensuring access to emergency contraception, and prohibiting
restrictions or delays in coverage.108 Still, there is no law that truly prohibits the application
of utilization management to contraception in all circumstances.
The following sections outline the most common utilization management restrictions
placed on contraception and the burdens they impose.
1. Step Therapy
The practice of step therapy, requiring a patient to try less expensive drugs and
experience failure or contraindication before covering the prescribed drug, is pervasive in
the insurance industry.109 For those suffering from serious illness, this requirement can be
outright cruel. Step therapy requires patients to bear the physical, emotional, and
sometimes financial toll of suffering through potentially inadequate treatment. 110 Their
physical health may deteriorate, sometimes fatally, as they wait for coverage of the drug
recommended by their physicians. 111 They may experience side effects and adverse
reactions from the cheaper drugs they are forced to try first.112 This physical suffering also
damages their social, economic, and psychological health. 113 Additionally, they may
ultimately have to pay exorbitant out-of-pocket costs for their preferred drug because they
simply cannot suffer through the imposed waiting period.
104

FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation (Part XXVI), supra note 36, at 4 (referring to
utilization management techniques as “reasonable medical management techniques”).
105
Contraceptive Coverage Equity Act of 2014, CA. S.B. 1053 (2014).
106
Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, GUTTMACHER INST., [hereinafter Guttmacher Inst., Insurance
Coverage of Contraceptives], https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/insurance-coveragecontraceptives (last visited Jul. 9, 2021).
107
For example, California law explicitly allows insurers to use utilization management procedures when a
therapeutic equivalent of a prescribed drug is not available. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 1367.25(b)(2)(B)–
(C) (2019).
108
Comprehensive Contraceptive Coverage Act of 2019, N.Y. S.B. S659A (2019).
109
Sharona Hoffman, Step Therapy: Legal, Ethical, and Policy Implications of a Cost-Cutting Measure, 73
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 38, 39 (2018).
110
Id. at 38–40.
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Step therapy acts as a significant barrier to contraceptive access as well.114 Requiring
a particular contraceptive to “fail” before covering the preferred method seems absurd.
What would failure look like? Must a woman actually conceive a child before her insurance
will cover the preferred method? At least one woman has been told exactly that. The
National Women’s Law Center has reported that a caller to their CoverHer contraceptive
coverage hotline was told she would first have to “show that the birth control covered by
the plan had led to ‘therapeutic failure(s)’ (meaning that the contraceptive failed to work—
that is, that she became pregnant) or ‘adverse event(s)’” before they would cover the
contraceptive she needed.115 Surely such a blatant inducement to unintended pregnancy
runs counter to the intention of the contraceptive mandate. And this requirement
contravenes public health goals in other ways. As discussed previously, the risk of
unintended pregnancy is higher when a woman is forced to use an unwanted contraceptive
method, let alone several. Furthermore, side effects from unwanted drugs may cause
women to forego contraception entirely.116 Studies have shown that step therapy generally
worsens medication adherence.117 Additionally, changing insurance plans may disrupt step
therapy, thus interrupting contraceptive use, because new plans may not have access to
medication history.118
2. Prior Authorization
Insurers also force providers to obtain a determination that a recommended drug is
necessary for a specific patient before it is prescribed, a technique known as prior
authorization.119 This process can delay care, sometimes for weeks, while a provider waits
for the insurer’s determination.120 As with step therapy, this type of delay in treatment can
have serious consequences for patients.121
See Michelle Andrews, Contraception Is Free To Women, Except When It's Not, NPR (Jul. 21, 2021),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/07/21/1018483557/contraception-is-free-to-women-exceptwhen-its-not (reporting that one insurer requires women to try eight other contraceptive methods before
covering the newer contraceptive method Phexxi); ACOG, Access to Contraception, supra note 41, at 252
(“Some insurers, clinic systems, or pharmacy and therapeutics committees also require women to ‘fail’
certain contraceptive methods before a more expensive method, such as an IUD or implant, will be
covered.”); Mia R. Zolna, Megan L. Kavanaugh & Kinsey Hasstedt, Insurance-related Practices at Title Xfunded Family Planning Centers under the Affordable Care Act: Survey and Interview Findings, 28
WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 21, 25 (2018) (finding that 12% of surveyed Title X clinics reported that
Medicaid required their clients to “use certain [contraceptive] methods before ‘stepping up’ to more costly
ones” and 18% of clinics reported the same requirement imposed by private insurers).
115
Issue Brief: Exception Policies: Advocating for No-Cost Coverage of Noncovered Contraceptives,
NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. at 2 (Mar. 2021) [hereinafter NWLC, Exception Policies], https://nwlc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/03/Exceptions-Guide.pdf (citing BCBS Federal Employee Program Formulary Tier
Exception Member Request Form on file with National Women’s Law Center).
116
Daniels, Mosher & Jones, Contraceptive Methods Women Have Ever Used, supra note 1, at 8.
117
Linda M. Sobeski, Christine A. Schumacher, Nancy A. Alvarez, Keri C. Anderson, Bridget Bradley,
Susie J. Crowe, Jessica R. Merlo, Adowoa Nyame, Kelley S. Rivera, Nancy L. Shapiro, Dustin D. Spencer
& Elizabeth Van Dril, Medication Access: Policy and Practice Opportunities for Pharmacists, 4 J. AM.
COLL. CLINICAL PHARM. 113, 115 (2021) [hereinafter Sobeski et al.].
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Prior authorization, like step therapy, has been shown to negatively affect medication
adherence.122 Patients may simply forego medication entirely after an initial rejection or
even while waiting for a determination. And a significant number of requests are rejected.
In a 2010 survey conducted by the AMA, over half of the 2,400 physicians surveyed
reported 20% overall rejection of their initial authorization requests for drugs.123 In such
cases, the burden is on the patient to undertake a lengthy and cumbersome appeal or pay
for the medication out-of-pocket.
Prior authorization requirements are undoubtedly burdening access to preferred
contraception.124 As with step therapy, delays in receipt of preferred contraception increase
the risk of unintended pregnancy and could result in non-use. This is particularly true with
long-acting reversible contraception (LARCs) such as IUDs and implants, where prior
authorization prevents same-day insertion, requiring multiple trips to a provider. 125
Requiring multiple provider visits imposes additional economic and social burdens on
women and may substantially lower the likelihood of them returning to obtain
contraception at all. Indeed, studies shows that the requirement of an additional provider
visit is one of the most common reasons women seeking LARCs do not receive them.126
Further, prior authorization may be invisibly limiting the contraceptive options a woman
is even presented with. Frequent rejections, cumbersome and plan-specific administrative
requirements, and vague or outdated information regarding which drugs are required for
prior authorization have caused over three-quarters of providers to “switch[] treatments at
least once to avoid the prior authorization process.”127 This subtle manipulation of provider
behavior only further obscures the role that insurance cost-containment plays in restricting
contraceptive access.
3. Quantity Limits
Insurers routinely attempt to control costs by limiting the number of prescriptions or
services covered within a given time period. According to ACOG, “Insurance plan
restrictions prevent 73% of women from receiving more than a single month’s supply of
contraception at a time, yet most women are unable to obtain contraceptive refills on a
timely basis.”128 In a recent survey, nearly one-third (31%) of hormonal contraceptive users
poses a serious risk to the health and safety of plan enrollees, including permanent damage or death.”).
122
Sobeski, Alvarez, Bradley, Merlo, Shapiro, Van Dril, Schumacher, Anderson, Crow, Nyame, Rivera &
Spencer, supra note 117, at 115.
123
AM. MED. ASS’N, STANDARDIZATION OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION PROCESS FOR MEDICAL SERVICES
WHITE PAPER 5 (Jun. 2011).
124
See, e.g., Zolna, Kavanaugh & Hasstedt, supra note 114 (finding that prior authorization was the second
most common coverage restriction reported by Title X clinic administrators).
125
Caitlin M. D. Parks & Jeffrey F. Peipert, Eliminating Health Disparities in Unintended Pregnancy with
Long-Acting Reversible Contraception (LARC), 214 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 681, 685 (2016).
126
Neko M. Castleberry, Lauren Stark, Jay Schulkin & Daniel Grossman, Implementing Best Practices for
the Provision of Long-Acting Reversible Contraception: A Survey of Obstetrician-Gynecologists, 100
CONTRACEPTION 123, 126 (2019).
127
Worthy, McClughen & Kulkarni, supra note 119, at 1065–66; see also Sobeski, Alvarez, Bradley, Merlo,
Shapiro, Van Dril, Schumacher, Anderson, Crow, Nyame, Rivera & Spencer, supra note 117, at 115 (noting
the additional time and resources required for providers to complete the prior authorization process and
acknowledging that “significant variations” and frequent changes in utilization management criteria among
insurers creates a barrier to medication access).
128
ACOG, Access to Contraception, supra note 41, at 252.
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reported having missed taking their birth control because they were not able to get their
next supply of pills. 129 For this reason, ACOG recommends that insurers support the
provision of a 3–13 month supply of hormonal contraceptives.130 Quantity limits impact
LARC usage as well. Multiple LARC placements are sometimes necessary if insertion is
performed incorrectly or the device is expelled. In a 2015 survey, over one hundred LARC
researchers identified insurance company limitations on the number of LARC devices
prescribed to women in a three-to-five-year period as a significant barrier to LARC
usage.131
The COVID-19 pandemic has only exacerbated the harm caused by quantity limits.
A recent survey of women’s health during the pandemic revealed that “Nearly one in ten
women ages 18–25 (8%) and 7% of women ages 26–35 say they delayed or were not able
to get birth control due to the COVID-19 pandemic.”132 In general, approximately 18% of
women in fair or poor health said they had “either not filled a prescription, cut pills in half
or skipped doses of medicine because of the COVID-19 pandemic.”133 Certainly, quantity
limits played a role in this restricted access, where office closures, stay-at-home mandates,
and concerns about virus transmission greatly increased the burden of multiple visits to
pharmacies or providers.
Several states have responded to this problem. Currently, twenty states and D.C. have
enacted laws requiring insurers to cover an extended supply of contraceptives. 134
Unfortunately, insurers do not always comply with these laws. For example, in April 2020,
the New York Attorney General’s office released a statement demanding that three health
insurance companies comply with state law requiring that they cover 12-month supplies of
contraception after receiving “multiple complaints” of coverage denial.135
4. Other Prescription Limitations
Women face several other restrictions on coverage of prescription contraceptives.
Insurers, typically PBMs, develop a drug formulary, or preferred drug list, specifying the
availability and coverage amount of a specific drug.136 Initially, they may deny coverage
of a contraceptive that is not on the formulary, leading to delays and possible

Frederiksen et al., Women's Sexual and Reproductive Health Services, supra note 60. See also ACOG,
Access to Contraception, supra note 41, at 252 (“data show that provision of a year’s supply of
contraceptives is cost effective and improves adherence and continuation rates.”).
130
ACOG, Access to Contraception, supra note 41, at 251.
131
Diana Greene Foster, Rana Barar, Heather Gould, Ivette Gomez, Debbie Nguyen & M. Antonia Biggs,
Projections and Opinions from 100 Experts in Long-Acting Reversible Contraception, 92 CONTRACEPTION
543, 546–47 (2015).
132
Brittni Frederiksen, Usha Ranji, Alina Salganicoff & Michelle Long, Women’s Experiences with Health
Care During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Findings from the KFF Women's Health Survey, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. (Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/womens-experiences-withhealth-care-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-findings-from-the-kff-womens-health-survey/.
133
Id.
134
Guttmacher Inst., Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, supra note 106.
135
Attorney General James Demands Health Insurance Providers Obey the Law, Protect Women’s Access
to Birth Control, N.Y. ATT’Y GEN. (Apr. 19, 2020), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2020/attorney-generaljames-demands-health-insurance-providers-obey-law-protect-womens.
136
Sobeski, Alvarez, Bradley, Merlo, Shapiro, Van Dril, Schumacher, Anderson, Crow, Nyame, Rivera &
Spencer, supra note 117, at 114.
129
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nonadherence.137 This is particularly true for newer contraceptives where formulary update
often lags behind the publishing of new clinical evidence138 and insurers may have a “newto-market” policy that delays the addition of any new drug to their formularies. 139
Additionally, insurers may significantly alter their formularies after the start of the plan
year, sometimes even forcing patients to switch to therapeutically equivalent drugs without
provider knowledge. 140 Further, ever-changing, complex, and plan-specific formularies
can be difficult and time-consuming for providers to navigate, leading to drug
recommendations that may not always be in the best interest of the patient.141 As with prior
authorization, the hidden impact of these insurance practices is deeply concerning. This is
especially true because provider recommendations may frequently run counter to
See id. (noting negative effect of delays and initial coverage denial on medication adherence); Tracey
Wilkinson, Obamacare Was Supposed to Make All Birth Control Free. As a Doctor, I See It’s Not
Happening., VOX (Sept. 6, 2016) (relating provider experiences with contraceptive coverage denials
causing nonadherence among patients: “There is one patient I remember clearly who wanted to begin
taking oral contraceptive pills. We discussed the different types of pills and how we would start with a lowdose estrogen pill given that this was her first time using contraception. I saw her during a follow-up a
month later and learned that she hadn’t received the prescription that I sent to the pharmacy. When I called
the pharmacy to figure out what happened, the pharmacist explained that the insurance company formulary
didn’t cover the specific contraception I had prescribed. The health plan did cover one with a slightly
higher dose of estrogen, and the pharmacy had tried to contact our office to substitute the prescription but
had been unsuccessful in reaching us.”).
138
See Sobeski, Alvarez, Bradley, Merlo, Shapiro, Van Dril, Schumacher, Anderson, Crow, Nyame, Rivera
& Spencer, supra note 117, at 114 (“Ideally, formulary and benefits decisions should be based on the most
up-to-date clinical evidence. However, the lag time required to review the evidence, develop criteria, and
secure contracts with drug manufacturers may result in the publication of outdated formularies. In addition,
clinical guideline updates are not synchronized, further expanding discrepancies between clinical guideline
recommendations and medication formularies.”).
139
See Martha M. Rumore & F. Randy Vogenberg, PBM P&T Practices: The HEAT Initiative is Gaining
Momentum, 42 P&T 330, 330–31 (2017) (noting that PBMs frequently exclude new-to-market drugs from
their formularies); CVS CAREMARK, FORMULARY DRUG REMOVALS (Jul. 2021),
https://www.caremark.com/portal/asset/Formulary_Exclusion_Drug_List.pdf (describing PBM policy that
“[n]ew-to-market products and new variations of products already in the marketplace will not be added to
the formulary immediately.”).
140
Worthy, McClughen & Kulkarni, supra note 119, at 1059 (discussing a 2015 study in which half of
insurers revised their formularies after the beginning of the plan year).
141
THE KENNEDY FORUM, A CONSUMER GUIDE TO DRUG FORMULARIES: UNDERSTANDING THE
FUNDAMENTALS OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH MEDICATIONS 1 (Aug. 2017), https://pjk-wpuploads.s3.amazonaws.com/www.thekennedyforum.org/uploads/2017/09/170824-KF-Consumer-GuideDrug-Form-Issue-Brief-0817_4.pdf. See also Sobeski, Alvarez, Bradley, Merlo, Shapiro, Van Dril,
Schumacher, Anderson, Crow, Nyame, Rivera & Spencer, supra note 117 at 115 (“Navigating online
formularies is time-consuming and requires that providers have accurate drug plan information and
working knowledge of UM tools in order to identify the most up-to-date information.”); Brittany Cogdill &
Jean Nappi, Assessment of Prescribers’ Knowledge of the Cost of Medications, 46 ANNALS
PHARMACOTHERAPY 200 (2012) (finding that the majority of surveyed prescribers “rarely asked
about a patient's prescription insurance coverage or consulted a discounted drug list
before writing a prescription.”); Utilization Management: Barriers to Care and Burdens on Small Medical
Practices: Hearing Before the Comm. on Small Bus., 116th Cong. 8 (2019) (describing a small town family
physician’s experience working with thirty-five different insurers “each of which has its own system of
prior authorization and drug formularies, and which change on a regular basis. I often do not know in
advance which medications in which class will be covered, and this often means that when I wrote a
prescription, my patient has to take it to the pharmacy to find out if it is covered. And if it is not, then I need
to find an alternative often by writing a new prescription and the process gets repeated.”).
137

80

Vol. 17:2]

Jennifer Hickey

contraceptive preferences. A significant percentage of participants in a recent study
indicated that they were not using their preferred contraceptive because their provider
recommended an alternative.142
Formularies designed to cover only the minimally required contraceptive drugs and
devices still impose substantial burdens. As discussed previously, insurers are only
obligated to cover one method in each of the eighteen FDA-defined categories of birth
control without cost-sharing. Even assuming strict adherence to this federal guidance, there
are many reasons why a woman might prefer a particular method within a category. There
are often significant differences between the methods in a category. For example, the
various brands of progestin IUDs have different replacement rates and are differently
sized.143 One brand may be better suited for smaller women and there are myriad reasons,
such as family spacing, that women may prefer a device that requires replacement in three
years rather than five.144 Further, providers are not likely to know which specific method
is covered by a patient’s insurance plan when prescribing, particularly in the case of oral
contraceptives, where there are over one hundred different types of pills and only three
categories.145 Pharmacies may fail to inform providers when coverage is rejected, leaving
patients to seek an alternative prescription on their own, significantly increasing the risk of
non-adherence. 146 Additionally, requiring the usage of a generic drug may burden
contraceptive access. A brand name contraceptive may be preferable for certain patients at
risk of non-adherence even when not medically necessary. Some patients may be confused
by different packaging of generics, fear that they received the wrong medication, or
generally distrust generic medications.147 Further, a single covered contraceptive within a
method category may not be available at pharmacies, particularly in rural or hard-to-reach
areas.148
Additionally, women face coverage denials of new contraceptive methods that have
not yet been incorporated into the FDA birth control guide. For example, many insurers
have refused to cover Phexxi, a hormone-free vaginal gel that was approved by the FDA
in 2020. 149 According to Phexxi’s manufacturers, insurers frequently deny coverage
Frederiksen et al., Women's Sexual and Reproductive Health Services, supra note 60.
Erin Armstrong & Agata Pelka, Medical Management and Access to Contraception, NAT’L HEALTH
LAW PROGRAM (Mar. 15, 2016), https://healthlaw.org/resource/medical-management-and-access-tocontraception/.
144
Id.
145
Wilkinson, supra note 137. See also Sobeski, Alvarez, Bradley, Merlo, Shapiro, Van Dril, Schumacher,
Anderson, Crow, Nyame, Rivera & Spencer, supra note 117, at 115 (discussing the barrier to medication
access resulting from providers’ inability to access or navigate patient-specific formulary information).
146
Wilkinson, supra note 137 (“Sometimes I will get a call from a pharmacy asking to change the birth
control I prescribed—and that’s if the pharmacy happens to get ahold of me during business hours.
Sometimes I will get a fax requesting insurance-specific paperwork to be completed to justify why a
method was chosen over another. But most frequently, it isn’t until the patient returns to tell me what
happens that I find out she wasn’t able to get her birth control. This means she never started to use it and
has been at risk for an unplanned pregnancy for the days, weeks, and months that have passed since I last
saw her.”).
147
See S.S. Dunne & C.P. Dunne, What do people really think of generic medicines? A systematic review
and critical appraisal of literature on stakeholder perceptions of generic drugs, 13 BMC MED. 1, 22–24
(2015).
148
NWLC, Exception Policies, supra note 115, at 4. See also Wilkinson, supra note 137 (noting possibility
that a patient’s pharmacy may not stock a prescribed contraceptive).
149
Andrews, supra note 114.
142
143
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because the product is missing from the FDA chart, which has not been updated since the
category rule went into effect.150 This lack of guidance allows insurers total discretion in
determining the birth control category to which new contraceptives like Phexxi belong.
Consequently, many insurers incorrectly classify Phexxi as a spermicide and refuse full
coverage because they are already covering one method from the spermicide category
without cost-sharing.151
Sixteen states and D.C. have responded to these issues by requiring insurers to cover
at least one therapeutic equivalent of every contraceptive drug or device, regardless of
category.152 In these states, if a particular contraceptive has no therapeutic equivalent, it
must be covered without cost-sharing. Additionally, some states require insurers to cover
an alternative therapeutic equivalent when a particular covered contraceptive is not
available to a patient.153
5. Narrow Networks
Narrow network insurance policies have become increasingly widespread after the
enactment of the ACA.154 In order to contain costs, insurers keep their networks “narrow”
by contracting only with a small number of hospitals and doctors, paying them a discounted
fee for their services in exchange for funneling in new patients.155 Naturally this limits the
options available to patients and may result in the “surprise” usage of out-of-network care.
Network adequacy typically requires “reasonable access to enough in-network primary
care and specialty physicians, and all health care services included under the terms of the
contract.”156 “For a network to be considered adequate, it must offer access to adequate
care, at the appropriate time, and without requiring an unreasonable amount of travel.”157
Technically, a network could meet this definition but still burden contraceptive access.
Women may not seek care or receive the optimal contraceptive method if they are
unable to access a preferred provider or pharmacy in-network. A 2014 Kaiser survey found
150

Id.
Id.
152
Guttmacher Inst., Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, supra note 106 (reporting that sixteen states
plus D.C. prohibit cost-sharing of contraceptives). Each state law specifically requires coverage of all FDAapproved contraceptive methods without cost-sharing unless there is a therapeutically equivalent drug or
device. The FDA considers drug products to be therapeutically equivalent “if they are pharmaceutical
equivalents for which bioequivalence has been demonstrated, and they can be expected to have the same
clinical effect and safety profile when administered to patients under the conditions specified in the
labeling.” See also FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (ORANGE BOOK) Preface (41st Ed. 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs/orange-book-preface.
153
See NWLC, Exception Policies, supra note 115, at 4 (quoting Nevada law: “If a covered therapeutic
equivalent . . . is not available or a provider of health care deems a covered therapeutic equivalent to be
medically inappropriate, an alternate therapeutic equivalent prescribed by a provider of health care must be
covered by the insurer.”); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 1367.25(b)(2)(B)–(C) (“If a covered therapeutic
equivalent of a drug, device, or product is not available, or is deemed medically inadvisable by the
enrollee's provider, a health care service plan shall provide coverage, subject to a plan's utilization
management procedures, for the prescribed contraceptive drug, device, or product without cost sharing.”).
154
Janet L. Lerman & Frank E. Stepnowski, The Narrow-Network Nightmare, 103 ILL. B.J. 32, 32 (2015).
155
Id.
156
NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS, Network Adequacy,
https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_network_adequacy.html (last visited Jul. 9, 2021).
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Worthy, McClughen & Kulkarni, supra note 119, at 1076.
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that 23% of women in marketplace plans could not get appointments with their chosen
provider and 20% were told that their chosen provider did not take their insurance.158 These
restrictions may be especially significant if a woman has switched insurance plans and can
no longer see her existing provider. 159 Additionally, younger women on their parents’
insurance plans may not be able to access in-network contraceptive care if they have moved
away from home. 160 And women may not be able or willing to drive a “reasonable”
distance to an in-network pharmacy to obtain contraception, particularly if they are also
subject to quantity limits.
Out-of-network restrictions may also burden postpartum LARC or sterilization
procedures. Even if a woman uses an in-network hospital, she may receive services from
out-of-network specialists, such as anesthesiologists.161
6. Other Restrictions
Insurers may impose other restrictions that necessitate multiple visits to providers or
pharmacies. For example, some insurers require clinics to order contraceptive devices
directly from them once prescribed to a patient, necessitating multiple visits for IUD
insertion because the provider cannot keep the devices in stock.162 As discussed previously,
studies have shown that women are much less likely to use contraception if they are
required to make multiple visits to a provider or pharmacy. For this reason, ACOG
recommends same-day provision.163 Additionally, insurers may require a prescription for
contraception that is available over-the-counter (OTC), such as spermicide, female or male
condoms, the contraceptive sponge, and even emergency contraception. 164 This
requirement forces women to undergo a burdensome and unnecessary provider visit to
obtain a prescription, contravening the intent of OTC status.165
Additionally, insurers do not always cover all related contraceptive services. The
ACA requires insurers to cover clinical services related to contraception, such as
contraceptive counseling and device insertion and removal. Yet insurers have failed to
consistently provide this coverage.166 This non-compliance may be due to a lack of clarity
Alina Salganicoff & Laurie Sobel, Women, Private Health Insurance, and the Affordable Care Act, 26
WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 2, 4 (2016).
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Mary C. Politi, Adam Sonfield & Tessa Madden, Addressing Challenges to Implementation of the
Contraceptive Coverage Guarantee of the Affordable Care Act, 315 JAMA 653, 654 (2016).
162
Jaclyn J. Serpico, JaNelle M. Ricks, Wendy G. Smooth, Catherine Romanos, Daniel L. Brook & Maria
F. Gallo, Access to Single-Visit IUD Insertion at Obstetrician-Gynecology Practices in Ohio: An Audit
Study, 102 CONTRACEPTION 190, 192 (2020).
163
ACOG, Access to Contraception, supra note 41, at 253.
164
ELIZABETH MCCAMAN, NAT’L HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, CONTRACEPTIVE EQUITY IN ACTION: A TOOLKIT
FOR STATE IMPLEMENTATION 6 (2019), https://healthlaw.org/resource/contraceptive-equity-in-action-atoolkit-for-state-implementation/ [hereinafter McCaman, Contraceptive Equity in Action].
165
Elizabeth McCaman, Model Contraceptive Equity Act: Legislative Language and Issue Brief, NAT’L
HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, at 7 (Jan. 31, 2019), https://healthlaw.org/resource/model-contraceptive-equityact-legislative-language-and-issue-brief/.
166
See NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. The Biden Administration Must Ensure the Affordable Care Act
Contraceptive Coverage Requirement is Working for All 8 (Oct. 2021), https://nwlc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/10/NWLC_BC_AffordCareAct-Oct_2021.pdf [hereinafter NWLC, ACA Working for
All] (reporting insurance coverage denials of services related to tubal litigation and IUD placement); NAT’L
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on the federal guidelines or because providers are unaware of the correct way to bill for
such services.167
Thus, having insurance does not guarantee adequate access to contraception. This
non-exhaustive catalog of possible restrictions on contraceptive access demonstrates the
degree to which private profit conflicts with public responsibility for family planning in
managed care.
C. Profit-Driven Medical Necessity
While the ACA permits insurers to use the above cost control techniques to limit
access to contraception, they are required to cover a particular contraceptive without costsharing if a physician determines that the product is medically necessary.168 In this way,
insurers seem to be more tightly regulated in the distribution of contraceptives than a great
deal of other medical products and services. However, insurers, rather than providers,
typically have the final word on medical necessity. They may improperly exercise this
authority to burden contraceptive access.
The concept of medical necessity has been dubbed the “primary gatekeeper for the
utilization of health care services” in the United States.169 Insurers routinely deny coverage,
and thus prevent treatment, based on in-house determinations that a product or service is
not medically necessary. Through the well-known practice of utilization review, insurance
companies attempt to control costs by reviewing claims and rejecting those they deem not
medically necessary.170 This rejection may occur during or after a patient is undergoing
treatment or it may act as a barrier to recommended treatment, as in the case of prior
authorization requirements.171
As scholars have noted, medical necessity is a fluid concept which has no standard
industry or federal statutory definition and is subject to varying economic and ideological
interpretations. 172 A number of principles may underlie an insurer’s determination of
medical necessity, including whether the recommended treatment aligns with customary
medical practice, is “effective,” and is not provided merely “as a convenience to the patient
or provider.”173 Regardless, the insurer’s overarching profit motivation ensures that cost
WOMEN’S LAW CTR, State of Birth Control Coverage: Health Plan Violations of the Affordable Care Act
8-9 (2015), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/State-of-Birth-Control-Coverage-Health-PlanViolations-of-the-ACA.pdf [hereinafter NWLC, State of Birth Control Coverage] (reporting insurer refusal
to cover IUD removal). See also Andrews, supra note 114 (reporting woman’s successful appeal of insurer
charge of $248 for an ultrasound accompanying IUD insertion).
167
Politi, Sonfield & Madden, supra note 161, at 653–54.
168
DEP’TS OF LAB., HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., AND THE TREASURY, supra note 36, at 4.
169
Daniel Skinner, Defining Medical Necessity Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 73
PUBLIC ADM. REV. S49, S49 (2013).
170
Jendusa, supra note 78, at 123–25; see also Dolgin, supra note 88, at 444 (“In the United States, almost
all medical necessity determinations, both for patients with private coverage and for those covered through
government programs, are made by insurance company employees.”).
171
Jendusa, supra note 78, at 123–25.
172
See Dolgin, supra note 88, at 438–46 (discussing “Medical Necessity — A Term in Search of an
Agenda”); Skinner, supra note 169; John V. Jacobi, Tara Adams Ragone & Kate Greenwood, Health
Insurer Market Behavior After the Affordable Care Act: Assessing the Need for Monitoring, Targeted
Enforcement, and Regulatory Reform, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 109, 129–31 (2015) (discussing the “inherent
indeterminacy” of medical necessity judgments).
173
Jacobi, Adams Ragone, and Greenwood, supra note 172, at 130 (quoting Linda A. Bergthold, Medical
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plays a role in this determination. Indeed, utilization review has been the subject of a great
deal of controversy over the years, as insurers are necessarily financially incentivized to
override the medical judgment of providers, causing patients to suffer through delay or
denial of care. 174 While it may be difficult to determine the degree to which medical
necessity determinations are driven by profit motive, there is certainly reason to believe
that cost concerns often override concern for patient health. Examples abound of coverage
denials that flagrantly disregard the medical needs of a patient.175 Further, while medical
necessity determinations are meant to be made by nurses or physicians employed by the
insurance company, providers have reported that these reviews are “often” conducted by
insurance company representatives with no medical training.176
The federal government has done little to limit the discretion generally afforded to
insurers in medical necessity determinations. The ACA only further codified this discretion
by explicitly granting insurers the “flexibility to employ appropriate medical review and
determination of medical necessity.” 177 The ACA does not define medical necessity or
limit the manner of its determination in any significant way, even within the Medicare or
Medicaid programs. 178 Further, shortly after passage of the ACA, the IOM considered
implementing a standardized definition of the term and an accompanying set of
implementation guidelines. 179 However, the IOM ultimately could not reconcile the
divergent views of various stakeholders. 180 Unsurprisingly, providers and the public
generally supported national standardization, while private insurers opposed the move.181
While the ACA requires insurers to defer to a provider’s judgment that a particular
contraceptive is medically necessary, it is doubtful that they will just accept a provider’s
determination when “medical necessity” is such an amorphous term. Indeed, the concept
of medical necessity does not seem entirely applicable to preventive care like
contraception. In other contexts, medical necessity often means that there is a physiological
need for a certain treatment. However, there are several non-medical reasons why a
particular contraceptive may be indicated, including possible side effects, personal
Necessity: Do We Need It?, 14 HEALTH AFFS. 180, 182–83 (1995)).
174
Jendusa, supra note 78, at 125; see also Skinner, supra note 169, at S50 (“[T]he seemingly arbitrary and
decentralized nature of medical necessity decision making within managed care contexts gave rise to
debates in the 1990s that raised concerns that HMOs were scrutinizing physicians’ claims about patients’
needs for the purposes of profit rather than sound medical judgment[.]”); Dolgin, supra note 88, at 445
(“Gregg Bloche has contended that insurance companies' reliance on the notion of medical necessity in
reviewing medical claims can be an opaque form of rationing, grounded not in concern for the potential
advantages of the intervention at issue, but in concern for cost.”).
175
See, e.g., Jendusa, supra note 78, at 129–33 (describing insurer’s denial of coverage of physical therapy
to treat multiple sclerosis in which the insurer’s reviewing physician did not review the patient’s medical
records, speak to her physicians, examine the patient, or consult any medical literature regarding her
condition); Hoffman, supra note 109, at 46 (quoting Dr. Benjamin Kopp, a pediatric pulmonologist: “I have
prescribed certain pulmonary medications for a toddler, only to have the health insurer insist on a lower
cost medication that is designed for a teenager. This shows me the decisions about step therapy
requirements do not involved pediatricians, asthma specialists, and pharmacists who know the most about
the medications.”).
176
AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 123, at 21.
177
CHERYL ULMER ET AL., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST 95 (2012).
178
Dolgin, supra note 82, at 441–43.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 442.
181
Id. at 442–43.
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preference, and ease of use.182 While federal guidelines have specifically indicated that a
medical necessity determination may include these factors,183 insurers may be unaware of
the non-codified guidelines or may refuse to read into them a more expansive view of
medical necessity that considers social and economic factors. Accordingly, some states
have enacted laws that use broader terms to define the standard by which a physician’s
determination should be final, including “reasonable professional judgment,” “medically
advisable,” “medically appropriate”, and “medical determination.”184 Further, some states
have codified with stronger language the requirement that a provider’s determination is
final under these circumstances and cannot be overridden by insurers.185
Regardless, women face significant challenges even requesting a cost-sharing waiver
for a medically necessary contraceptive. The ACA requires that insurers have an “easily
accessible, transparent, and sufficiently expedient” process for requesting a waiver (also
commonly referred to as an “exception”) of the cost-sharing requirement when a provider
determines that a particular contraceptive is medically necessary.186 The waiver process
must not be “unduly burdensome on the individual or a provider.”187 Nonetheless, many
insurers have complicated or non-existent waiver processes. Noting that “many plans do
not have an exceptions policy[, m]any insurance companies, birth control users, and
providers are not aware of this requirement, and often the state agency does not enforce it,”
the National Women’s Law Center has reported that callers to their CoverHer hotline have
been told by their insurers that no exceptions process exists.188 Additionally, women have
reported that insurers are not fully complying with the wavier requirements. In one
instance, a woman was charged the difference in cost between the medically necessary
contraceptive and the covered one. 189 Providers have also encountered confusing and
cumbersome waiver requirements.190 As with other burdensome utilization management
practices, the desire to avoid complicated or ill-defined waiver processes may motivate
providers to steer patients towards a sub-optimal contraceptive. Thus, it is difficult to even
make it through the initial step of requesting a waiver, much less actually receive one.
The state’s placement of responsibility for contraception with the private market has
resulted in significant and often inequitable barriers to contraceptive access. Private
insurers inject profit considerations into public health through numerous cost-containing
NWLC, Exception Policies, supra note 115, at 2.
DEP’TS OF LAB., HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., & TREASURY, supra note 36, at 4.
184
NWLC, Exception Policies, supra note 115, at 3.
185
See id. (quoting New York law: “If the attending health care provider, in his or her reasonable
professional judgment, determines that the use of a non-covered therapeutic or pharmaceutical equivalent
of a drug, device, or product is warranted, the health care provider’s determination shall be final.”).
186
DEP’TS OF LAB., HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., & TREASURY, supra note 36, at 4–5.
187
Id.
188
NWLC, Exception Policies, supra note 115, at 2. See also NWLC, ACA Working for All, supra note 166,
at 7–8 (providing examples of reports to CoverHer in 2020 and 2021 of insurers telling women that no
exceptions process exists after contraceptive coverage was denied).
189
Laurie Sobel, Alina Salganicoff, Nisha Kurani, Jennifer Wiens, Kimsung Hawks & Linda Shields,
Coverage of Contraceptive Services: A Review of Health Insurance Plans in Five States, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. 17 (Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.kff.org/private-insurance/report/coverage-of-contraceptiveservices-a-review-of-health-insurance-plans-in-five-states/ [hereinafter KFF, Coverage of Contraceptive
Services].
190
See NWLC, Exception Policies, supra note 115, at 2 (reporting that health care providers have been
required to provide “chart notes to verify past medication trials” as part of the waiver process).
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techniques, treating family planning as a business rather than a vital matter of social
importance.
III. ABANDONING WOMEN TO THE MARKETPLACE
The state has delegated responsibility for family planning not only to private insurers,
but also to individual women. The ACA’s treatment of patients as consumers rests on a
false assumption that all women are freely able to participate in the market and to take
personal responsibility for all aspects of their healthcare. This abdication to the marketplace
inappropriately burdens individual women in numerous ways.
A. The Burden of Choice
It is glaringly obvious that the ACA’s reliance on the market to provide contraception
is ill-placed. The state allows insurers to impose profit-motivated constraints on
contraception access while abandoning women to the impossible task of “choosing” a plan
that provides affordable coverage of their preferred method. In reality, a woman facing
restrictions on her preferred contraceptive is rarely, if ever, able to simply choose another
health plan that would provide access. Employment status, income, and state of residence
almost always dictate health insurance coverage. Even when faced with options, the
opacity and complexity of pricing and quality information inherently preclude the informed
consumer necessary to a functional market, particularly when combined with the
psychological constraints of estimating risk and navigating illness. As a result, women are
entirely powerless to regulate contraceptive access through the market, yet the state places
enormous responsibility on them to fulfill the contraceptive mandate.
Firstly, most women are significantly constrained in their choice of health plans by
their employer. Approximately 61% of U.S. women ages 19-64 are covered by employersponsored health plans.191 Employers are not likely to offer a wide array of options because
there is less administrative burden and greater financial incentive in contracting with a
small number of plans. Yet it is extremely unlikely that a woman would reject an employersponsored plan in favor of a marketplace plan that would provide her preferred
contraception (assuming such a plan exists) because employer-sponsored plans are often
significantly more affordable and provide better overall coverage. 192 Thus, most U.S.
women realistically have little to no choice of health insurance plans.
This is especially troubling given that a significant portion of working women are on
employer-sponsored plans that are not subject to state contraceptive mandates.
Approximately 60% of U.S. workers are unable to take advantage of more expansive state
contraceptive equity laws because they are on “self-funded” plans that are exempt from
state regulation. 193 Employer-sponsored plans are still governed by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which was originally developed before
KFF, Women’s Health Insurance Coverage, supra note 7.
See John A. Graves & Pranita Mishra, The Evolving Dynamics of Employer-Sponsored Health
Insurance: Implications for Workers, Employers, and the Affordable Care Act, 94 MILBANK Q. 736, 737
(2016) (discussing lower cost of employer-sponsored plans compared to similar plans on individual
insurance market and the historically generous and comprehensive nature of employer-provided health
insurance benefits).
193
Guttmacher Inst., Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, supra note 106.
191
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the advent of managed care, with the primary goal of pension reform. 194 ERISA sought to
ease the burden of employers operating in multiple states by exempting them from state
insurance law, commonly known as ERISA preemption. 195 Under ERISA, states can
regulate a "fully-insured" plan, where an employer buys directly from a state-licensed
insurance company.196 However, states cannot regulate “self-funded” plans in which the
employer remains directly liable for fulfillment of insurance claims.197 Given that most
insurance regulation is left to the states, it is unsurprising that ERISA has motivated many
employers to self-insure to escape the law.198 Add to this the 13% of health insurance plans
that are still grandfathered and the religious exemptions afforded to employers with
objections to contraceptive coverage. The result is a potentially huge segment of the female
population confined by their employers to insurance plans that do not provide optimal
contraceptive coverage.
The small percentage of women who purchase their own health insurance199 are no
more likely to have meaningful choices. The ACA marketplace in a given state (or the
federal marketplace in states that have opted not to run their own) will probably only offer
a few plans and the quality of coverage may vary significantly, particularly in states without
a more expansive contraceptive mandate.200 Prohibitively high premiums may shrink the
list of viable options even further.201
Disturbingly, political resistance to federal regulation has weakened the already
sparse availability of ACA-compliant health plans. Professor Katherine Vukadin has
detailed the “obstructive federalism” crippling the ACA, where some states actively reject
their role in its fulfillment due to the political motivations of their leaders, some of whom
“actively want the ACA to fail.”202 While failure to expand Medicaid is the quintessential
example, a new development in Georgia undermines the ACA even further. In November
2020, the Trump administration approved Georgia’s application for a Section 1332
Medicaid “innovation” waiver that allows the state to exit the federal health insurance
exchange without offering a state exchange in its place.203 This effectively forces more
than 100,000 residents who previously used the exchange to shop directly for non194

Katherine T. Vukadin, Delayed and Denied: Toward an Effective ERISA Remedy for Improper
Processing of Healthcare Claims, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 331, 333, 336 (2011)
[hereinafter Vukadin, Delayed and Denied].
195
Id. at 336.
196
Id. at 333.
197
Id.
198
Allison K. Hoffman, Health Care Spending and Financial Security After the Affordable Care Act, 92
N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1496 (2014).
199
8% of women ages 19–64 were covered by a health insurance plan purchased directly from a non-group
market in 2019. KFF, Women’s Health Insurance Coverage, supra note 7.
200
See Daniel McDermott & Cynthia Cox, Insurer Participation on the ACA Marketplaces, 2014–2021,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.kff.org/private-insurance/issue-brief/insurerparticipation-on-the-aca-marketplaces-2014-2021/ (documenting average of 5 insurers per state in 2021,
with low of 3.5 in 2018 and peak of 6 in 2015, participation variance among states (with several states
having only one insurer participating), and significant variance of insurer participation even within a given
state).
201
Salganicoff & Sobel, supra note 158, at 3 (discussing reports of coverage loss due to non-payment of
premiums).
202
Katherine T. Vukadin, Obamacare Interrupted: Obstructive Federalism and the Consumer Information
Blockade, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 421, 445 (2015) [hereinafter Vukadin, Obamacare Interrupted].
203
Complaint at 2, Planned Parenthood Southeast Inc. v. Azar (D.D.C. 2021) (No. 1:21-cv-00117).
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compliant coverage through private brokers and health insurance companies. 204
Reproductive health providers have filed a federal lawsuit challenging the waiver, alleging
that it will leave many facing higher premiums and resorting to the purchase of “non-ACAcompliant junk insurance plans with bare-bones coverage” which “often have blanket
exclusions for basic health care services such as birth control” and “frequently fail to
provide coverage for preventive care such as birth control, cancer screenings, and wellwoman exams without out-of-pocket costs to patients.” 205 The Trump Administration
expanded access to two types of these “junk” plans, association health plans and short-term
health plans, in yet another effort to undermine the regulatory protections offered by the
ACA. 206 The House Committee on Energy and Commerce recently conducted an
investigation into short-term health insurance plans and found that they covered three
million Americans in 2019, a 27% increase from 2018.207 The investigation concluded that
the plans were “simply a bad deal for consumers.”208 They are certainly a bad deal for
women. The committee found that “[a] number of insurers exclude coverage of
contraception, including birth control pills, implants, injections, supply, treatment device
or procedure.”209 One insurer, NHIC, denied a claim for contraceptive services, informing
the claimant that “the plan does not include benefits for drugs or devices used directly or
indirectly to promote or prevent conception.”210 If allowed to stand, Georgia’s Medicaid
waiver will only further constrain a woman’s “choice” of contraceptive coverage by
forcing more women to purchase these plans and will likely provide a model for further
restriction in other states.
Even if a woman had limitless options in an unconstrained insurance market, it would
be nearly impossible for her to make an informed decision. Many scholars have pointed
out that our market-based solution to healthcare suffers from at least one fatal flaw:
imperfect information.211 Informed consumers are a cornerstone of the free market; the
market cannot contain costs through competition if consumers are not making informed
choices that provide a meaningful measure of value. 212 In reality, “consumers” of
healthcare rarely even know the price of healthcare products and services or have the
necessary information on quality and efficacy to compare alternatives when making health
care decisions.213 Additionally, those with more serious health conditions may perceive a
204

Id.
Id. at 64.
206
Dylan Scott, Trump’s Big New Proposal to Undercut the Affordable Care Act, Explained, VOX (Jan. 4,
2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/4/16849136/trump-association-health-plansexplained; Dylan Scott, Trump’s New Plan to Poke Holes in the Obamacare Markets, Explained, VOX (Feb.
20, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/2/20/17031640/short-term-insurance-trumpobamacare.
207
H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SHORTCHANGED: HOW THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S
EXPANSION OF JUNK SHORT-TERM HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS IS PUTTING AMERICANS AT RISK 6 (June
2020), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=841078.
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Id. at 4.
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Id. at 61.
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Id. at 73.
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See, e.g., Lawrence Singer, Health Care Is Not a Typical Consumer Good and We Should Not Rely on
Incentivized Consumers to Allocate It, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 703 (2017); Troy J. Oechsner & Magda
Schaler-Haynes, Keeping It Simple: Health Plan Benefit Standardization and Regulatory Choice Under the
Affordable Care Act, 74 ALB. L. REV. 241 (2010); Heled, Vertinsky & Brewer, supra note 99.
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Singer, supra note 211, at 710.
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lack of choice or be too incapacitated to make the appropriate decisions. 214 The health
insurance market suffers from similar constraints:
In order to be autonomous market actors, consumers require health plan
information that is "publicly available, understandable, and relevant to the
decision-making process." In many markets other than health insurance,
disclosure around quality occurs voluntarily . . . . In the health insurance
market, however, important information about products is often not fully
disclosed, or is confusing. As a result, consumers are unable to effectively
compare health insurance products. And consumers may not buy the
products they would have purchased if they had access to better
information. The inability of consumers to compare plans skews the pricing
of health plans: prices therefore do not reflect true consumer preference,
demand, or willingness to pay because consumers do not understand what
they are buying.215
Further, many are unaware of the protections afforded to them by the ACA or believe
the ACA has been repealed, leaving them unable to determine when a plan is noncompliant.216 Thus, “consumers” remain uninformed about virtually every aspect of health
care financing, yet the state relies on them to regulate the healthcare market.
Contraceptive coverage information is just as difficult to obtain or interpret. Studies
in multiple states have found that insurers provide “false or misleading” or contradictory
information on contraception coverage.217 Coverage information is often difficult to locate
or understand.218 One study surveyed plan documents across five states and concluded that
“[m]any of the publicly available documents do not clearly identify plan coverage rules
when it comes to how different contraceptive methods are covered and the limitations of
the coverage. This makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible for women in some plans
to ascertain their coverage options. This also makes it difficult for women to determine
coverage while comparing plans during open enrollment.”219 Advocates have found that
plan documents may be “inappropriately silent regarding contraceptive benefits, such as
the ability to obtain an off-formulary contraceptive without cost-sharing when medically
appropriate or an OTC product when prescribed, such as the internal condom.”220
While this illustrates a need for greater transparency, subjecting insurers to stricter
disclosure laws would only partially solve the problem. A consumer may not know how to
access disclosed information or may not be capable of interpreting or processing price and
Id. at 112. See also Singer, supra note 211 at 716 (discussing the potentially unreasonable expectation
that elderly or “frail” individuals locate and interpret health care cost information).
215
Oechsner & Schaler-Haynes, supra note 211, at 245–46.
216
Vukadin, Obamacare Interrupted, supra note 202, at 429.
217
JoNel Aleccia, Women Getting Bad Info on Birth-Control Coverage From ACA Insurers, SEATTLE TIMES
(Apr. 17, 2015, 6:52 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/health/women-seeking-birth-controlcoverage-get-wrong-messages-from-insurers-survey-finds/; EVERTHRIVE ILL. & U. OF CHI. SECT. OF FAM.
PLANNING AND CONTRACEPTIVE RSCH., COVERAGE OF CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN ILLINOIS’
QUALIFIED HEALTH PLANS 8 (2015), https://ci3.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Coverage-ofContraception-and-Abortion-in-Illinois-QHPs_6.24.pdf [hereinafter EVERTHRIVE ILL.].
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EVERTHRIVE ILL., supra note 217, at 7–8.
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quality data.221 Studies have shown that many do not understand standard insurance terms
such as "deductible," "out-of-pocket spending cap," or "co-pay"222 and that plan documents
are often written at a reading level that is higher than the average person’s
comprehension.223 Many individuals simply find the required balancing between features
of insurance plans such as premiums, cost-sharing, and network adequacy too complex and
confusing.224 Choosing a plan requires consumers to predict the types of care that they may
need in the future. This requires some knowledge of personal risk, yet studies show that
people routinely underestimate their own risk of illness due to lack of understanding of
contributing factors and/or general optimism.225 Simply requiring health insurers to make
information available is unlikely to solve these problems.
Nonetheless, as explained above, the ACA recognized at least a minimal state
responsibility to educate consumers on the complexities of plan purchase. However, once
again, “obstructive federalism” is causing many states to shirk even this most basic duty.
Unfortunately, political opposition to the ACA has caused some states to opt out of
consumer education obligations and, in some cases, to actively burden federal efforts by
imposing restrictions such as additional educational and licensing requirements and
prohibitions on information dissemination. 226 In so doing, these states significantly
undermine the ACA’s recognition of the importance of the informed consumer (albeit an
impossible goal).
Thus, even if it were appropriate for the state to delegate such an essential public
health matter as family planning to the private market, the “empowered consumer” in this
scenario is clearly a myth. Most insured women have little to no choice of health plans and
are subject to profit-motivated restrictions on contraceptive access that they cannot escape
or “regulate” by simply choosing another insurer. Choice is a fiction that allows the state
to shirk its responsibilities and places an impossible burden on individual women.
B. The Burden of Enforcement
While the state abandons women to the unrealistic usage of “purchasing power” to
regulate contraceptive access, it also forces women to shoulder the burden when an insurer
improperly denies a claim for contraceptive care. Insurers generally deny claims at an
alarming rate; studies have shown that as many as one out of every six healthcare claims
are denied. 227 Under ERISA and ACA, claimants facing a denial must endure a
See Singer, supra note 211, at 716 (“Even if a consumer wishes to secure price and quality information,
however, their ability to appropriately interpret this data may be rudimentary at best.”); Oechsner &
Schaler-Haynes, supra note 211, at 246–47 (discussing difficulties consumers face in understanding health
plan information).
222
Vukadin, Obamacare Interrupted, supra note 202, at 456.
223
Oechsner & Schaler-Haynes, supra note 211, at 246–47.
224
Id.
225
Id. at 248. See also Lawrence, supra note 65, at 623 (discussing “behavioral biases” such as optimism,
myopia, and projection bias identified as health insurance market failures in managed benefits literature).
226
Vukadin, Obamacare Interrupted, supra note 202, at 473–74.
227
Karen Pollitz & Daniel McDermott, Claims Denials and Appeals in ACA Marketplace Plans, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.kff.org/private-insurance/issue-brief/claims-denials-andappeals-in-aca-marketplace-plans (analyzing required disclosures to determine that, on average,
approximately 17% of in-network claims were denied in 2019 across HealthCare.gov issuers with complete
data). See also Caroline E. Mayer, The Claim Game, AARP MAGAZINE, Nov.–Dec. 2009 (reporting a rate
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complicated and burdensome appeals process that highly favors insurers. The state often
fails to meet even its minimal obligations to assist during the appeals process or investigate
complaints of improper denials. Once again, the regulatory burden falls on individual
women.
As an initial matter, an overwhelming majority of healthcare claim denials, upwards
of 90%, are never even appealed.228 This allows improper denials to stand unchallenged
and unexposed. Professor Vukadin offers several possible reasons why a claimant may not
appeal a claim denial. Initially, there is a “general human tendency” to remain with the
default option (no action) even when that option is not beneficial.229 This is exacerbated in
the context of health insurance where insurers may endorse the default option by, for
example, using language such as “your responsibility” on bills.230 Additionally, as with
choosing a plan, claimants may not question denials because they are unable to decipher
plan documents to determine if the denial was improper.231 They may also have difficulty
understanding complex medical bills.232
A woman who does challenge improper denial of her claim for contraceptive care is
faced with a complex and daunting administrative appeals process. Insurers, both private
and Medicaid managed care, are required to maintain an internal appeals process, which
must be exhausted before a claimant can file a lawsuit.233 Notably, internal appeals must
be initiated within a specific time frame after initial denial, 180 days for private insurance
and 60 days for Medicaid.234 While the ACA requires that insurers include information on
the appeals process in denial notices,235 they may not always comply, leaving women to
navigate complex procedural requirements and deadlines on their own.
After exhausting the internal appeals process, a claimant may initiate an independent
external review through her insurer or her state’s insurance commissioner. The ACA
significantly expanded access to this process with the goal of ensuring greater protection
of “consumers” facing improper denials.236 Now, insurers of all private plans, including
self-insured plans, must provide access to this type of review.237 Most states have their own
external review processes that are subject to federal guidelines. 238 Independent Review
of one in seven denials of initial claims across 1.4 billion claims submitted annually).
228
Vukadin, Delayed and Denied, supra note 194, at 338.
229
Katherine T. Vukadin, Unfinished Business: The Affordable Care Act and the Problem of Delayed and
Denied ERISA Healthcare Claims, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 887, 907–08 (2014) [hereinafter Vukadin,
Unfinished Business].
230
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HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 241, 265 (2016) (noting ERISA requirement as applies to employer-sponsored
plans); McCaman, Contraceptive Equity in Action, supra note 164, at 23 (describing appeals process for
Medicaid managed care).
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Organizations (IRO) conduct external reviews and issue decisions that are binding on all
parties.239
Unfortunately, there are several ways in which the external review process may still
fail to “protect” “consumers” of contraception. First, external review seems to be geared
towards denial of medical treatment rather than preventive care. Per federal regulations,
only decisions concerning “medical judgment” or coverage recission are reviewable by an
IRO. “Medical judgment” includes, but is not limited to, medical necessity determinations
and “[e]ffectiveness of a covered benefit.”240 As with medical necessity determinations,
this narrow focus on medicine seems to preclude a consideration of the many social factors
influencing one’s choice of contraception. Further, many states require that the independent
reviewer of the claim denial “[b]e an expert in the treatment of the covered person’s
medical condition that is the subject of the external review . . . .”241 It is extremely unclear
what type of “medical condition” a healthy woman needing family planning services would
be deemed to have, let alone what credentials would qualify an “expert.” Additionally,
advocates and scholars have questioned whether external reviewers can be unbiased.242
IROs are private companies hired by the insurers denying the claim at issue. 243 While
insurers are required to rotate assignments between at least three reviewers to maintain
impartiality, they are allowed to replace companies at will, an arrangement that seems to
give insurers the upper hand.244 Lastly, while an arbitration-like external review can be
preferable to expensive and time-consuming litigation, IROs are not required to make their
decisions public and their decisions carry no precedential value.245 Thus, IROs are shielded
from public scrutiny and future claimants are unable to benefit from prior decisions.
Assuming a privately insured woman can make it through this process and muster
the necessary resources to file a lawsuit, she still faces serious hurdles in ERISA litigation.
Significantly, there is a notable power imbalance between the parties. Insurers and their
attorneys are much more familiar with the appeals process and the plan benefits than the
average individual. Due to financial constraints, individuals are also much less likely to be
represented by counsel.246 Those suffering from serious illness face time constraints that
may lead them to accept bad settlements.247 In sum, the entire appeals process is heavily
stacked against an individual claimant.
The process also imposes substantial burdens on women seeking contraceptive care.
Importantly, it often results in a significant delay that compromises contraceptive care.
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Appeals can take several months to resolve.248 Add additional months or even years to this
if the claim is litigated. There are significant financial burdens as well. If even feasible,
women may pay for preferred contraception out-of-pocket, hoping to be reimbursed upon
successful resolution of their appeal. They may also have to pay for attorneys during the
administrative phase of the appeal.249 Worse yet, any damages suffered because of initial
claim denial are not recoverable because ERISA does not authorize compensatory
damages.250 Additionally, women must invest significant time and effort to gather medical
records and comply with other evidentiary requirements during each phase of the appeal.251
Some have proposed greater provider involvement to alleviate these burdens on
individual women. Even if it were acceptable to continue placing responsibility solely on
private individuals, there are several obstacles to implementation. Insurers often prohibit
the assignment of appellate rights to other parties, preventing healthcare providers from
appealing on behalf of their patients. 252 It is difficult for providers to even assist with
appeals because they “do not have access to” the necessary policy documents or
information concerning the appeals process.253 Even with the necessary knowledge, it is
unclear if providers would have the time to provide meaningful assistance.254
Left to shoulder substantial burden alone, it is no wonder that large numbers of
claimants drop out of the process at each level of appeal.255 Yet, overall, appeals are largely
successful. Approximately half of challenged claim denials are reversed on appeal. 256
Some portion of these denials undoubtedly result from mistakes, but given such an
astonishing reversal rate, it is hard not to conclude that a significant portion of denials are
profit driven. Indeed, evidence suggests that insurers are engaging in a number of bad faith
tactics, including rewarding employees for denying claims, replacing employees who do
not deny claims, and even engaging in fraudulent behavior like forging signatures on
coverage waivers in order to avoid paying claims.257 ERISA does little to deter insurers
from improperly denying claims in this manner and “effectively invites” bad faith strategic
approaches to claims payment. Insurers have an “enormous” financial incentive to deny
claims, yet “[u]nder the current approach, most non-compliance [with claims regulations]
is excused under the "substantial compliance" doctrine, and even substantial departures
from the claims regulations generally result in no substantive remedy.”258
Hoffman, supra note 109, at 57–58.
See Vukadin, Delayed and Denied, supra note 194, at 349 (noting that attorney’s fees are not
recoverable during the administrative phase of the appeal).
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Not only is the state abandoning women to a David versus Goliath-style fight against
unfair claim denials, but it is also failing to fulfill even the most basic enforcement
obligations. Claim denials are appealable to each state’s Department of Insurance (DOI) or
the United States Department of Labor (DOL) if the plan is self-insured (due to ERISA
preemption). 259 This avenue of enforcement should be highly preferable to the
individualized appeals process because it alleviates much of the burden on individual
women and has the potential to effect mass change. In practice, however, these agencies
are failing to adequately investigate complaints. Callers to NWLC’s CoverHer hotline have
reported several failures to resolve complaints regarding contraceptive coverage. 260 For
example, the DOL was unable to resolve women’s complaints when their insurers
improperly denied coverage of the vaginal contraceptive ring. Women in several states
reported similar coverage issues to their state DOIs and were met with refusal to
investigate. 261 Additionally, “obstructive federalism” has hobbled enforcement in most
states. The state consumer assistance centers envisioned by the ACA were intended to aid
with appeals as well as provide information on plan choice.262 Twenty-three states have
not even put these programs in place, leaving many without even basic government
assistance in filing their own appeals.263 Worse yet, by refusing to put the centers in place,
states are missing an opportunity to collect information from consumers for enforcement
purposes, hampering their ability to regulate insurers.264
Thus, the state allows and even incentivizes insurers to improperly deny claims while
abandoning women to fight these denials alone. This is hardly the sort of enforcement
necessary to meet the state’s responsibility for adequate contraceptive access.
C. Bearing the Consequences
Not only are women bearing the burden of enforcement alone, but they are also left
to shoulder the extreme consequences of unintended pregnancy when their efforts to
procure contraception fail. Because contraception and pregnancy are framed as the
products of individual choice, unintended pregnancy is viewed as a personal failure. Rather
than holding the state accountable for the myriad ways in which it has failed to meet its
family planning obligations by underregulating insurers, the pregnant woman is held
entirely responsible for managing the pregnancy and its outcome. When the state does get
involved, the response is often punitive and stigmatizing, targeting women who make “bad
choices” that may cause harm to the fetus.
Contraception is one of many public health matters that have long been subject to
narratives of individual responsibility. Professor Lindsey Wiley has noted that, despite
“[o]ur increasingly collective approach to ensuring health care access,” there remains
McCaman, Contraceptive Equity in Action, supra note 164, at 21–22 (describing the process for appeals
and complaints with state DOIs); NWLC, State of Birth Control Coverage, supra note 166, at 11 (stating
that DOL regulates self-funded coverage).
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“deep disagreement” about whether the root causes of poor health “are a matter of
collective responsibility or personal responsibility.”265 Serious illnesses such as cancer and
heart disease are framed as individual failure to engage in preventive activities like eating
well and exercising.266 Medicaid incentive programs and SNAP restrictions on unhealthy
food disproportionately place individual responsibility on low-income people of color.267
Similarly, some states once conditioned receipt of public assistance on the usage of
LARCs, a form of “reproductive coercion” that some have likened to sterilization laws of
the early twentieth century.268 Additionally, some opponents of the ACA have argued that
the public should not have to bear the cost of insuring those with preexisting conditions
because they “typically result from irresponsible conduct.” 269 Unsurprisingly,
contraception as preventive care is subject to the same framing. For example, conservative
political commentators are quick to oppose social responsibility for family planning
because they view sexuality as a matter of individual choice, and women can simply choose
to have sex less frequently if they cannot afford to buy contraception on their own.270
This pervasive focus on individual choice and individual responsibility precludes
state responsibility for unintended pregnancy. While the ACA’s contraceptive mandate
was an important step in recognizing public responsibility for family planning, a woman is
clearly on her own once the state fails to meet this obligation. 271 Abortion access is
constantly threatened with political attack and the need for an abortion is certainly not
constructed as a failure of the state to provide appropriate contraception. If an unintended
pregnancy is carried to term, women and their families are left to manage the pregnancy
and raise the child without adequate support from the state.272
Instead, the state is confined to a punitive role. In what is, at best, a misguided attempt
to improve birth outcomes, the state is increasingly criminalizing pregnancy.273 A study
analyzing data from 1973 to 2005 found 413 women had been subjected to state action due
to their behavior during pregnancy, either by criminalization or forced intervention. 274
These charges rarely seem justified by actual harm. No adverse pregnancy outcomes were
reported in two out of three overall cases in the study and many cases were brought solely
on the basis of possible harm. 275 A large majority of these criminal cases involved
Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 96 (2014).
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267
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269
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allegations of illegal drug use.276 Pregnant women have been criminally charged for drug
use during pregnancy under a number of state laws that essentially grant legal status to the
fetus, including assault, chemical endangerment of a child, criminal neglect, delivery of
drugs to a minor, and involuntary manslaughter.277 Again, a vast majority of these charges
were brought despite no showing of harm to the fetus. Further, these laws do not seem to
reflect scientific understanding of the “relatively small and short-term” effects of drug use
on fetuses.278
Women are also increasingly facing punishment for miscarriage or stillbirth.279 It is
estimated that several hundred U.S. women have been prosecuted for pregnancy
outcomes.280 For example, in 2018, an Alabama woman was indicted by a grand jury for
manslaughter after losing her 5-month-old fetus to a gunshot wound. While the person who
shot her was not criminally charged, she faced a severe prison sentence for being involved
in a fight while pregnant. 281 Similarly, women have faced criminal charges for
manslaughter or feticide due to failure to wear a seatbelt during a car accident, attempting
suicide, and even accidentally falling down the stairs.282 Women have even faced criminal
charges for giving birth to stillborn babies at home, absent any evidence that the fetuses
died of unnatural causes, under statutes that criminalize concealing a birth or death.283
Punitive state responses such as these cause substantial harm to pregnant women and
their families. Prison conditions can be harmful to the health of pregnant and birthing
women. Incarceration harms the families that these women leave behind. The involvement
of child welfare authorities can interrupt crucial maternal-newborn bonding and have
devastating effects on the entire family, subjecting them to surveillance and scrutiny that
could ultimately lead to removal of the child from the home and termination of parental
rights. 284 The justifiable fear of punishment creates a harmful deterrent effect. Some
women may not seek help for addiction, or even prenatal care at all, for fear that physicians
will report drug or alcohol use or other potentially “bad” behavior to the state.285 Lack of
prenatal care can cause substantial harm to both mother and fetus. This fact alone should
prompt serious reconsideration of punitive approaches.
Thus, the message is clear: it is almost entirely the responsibility of the individual
woman to avoid unwanted pregnancy, she is fully to blame for any adverse pregnancy
outcome that may result from her failure to properly plan, and she should be punished by
the state for this failure. We should expect more from the state, and we must begin by
calling for the meaningful fulfillment of its obligation to support family planning.
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IV. TOWARDS A RESPONSIVE STATE: A VULNERABILITY APPROACH
How might we achieve meaningful state support for family planning? This Section
first provides a theoretical framework for establishing state responsibility for contraception
and then suggests several actions that a more responsive state could take to improve
equitable access to contraception.
A. From Restrained to Responsive
While enactment of the ACA’s contraceptive mandate firmly establishes social
responsibility for contraception, the implementation is still highly individualistic. The state
attempts to fulfill its obligation for family planning by emphasizing individual marketplace
choice and minimally regulating insurers under the guise of individual consumer
protection. This consumer protection focus absolves the state of responsibility for family
planning, placing the burden of access and enforcement on individual women and their
families while targeting only the most flagrantly abusive behaviors of insurance
companies. Through this abdication of responsibility by the state, women are falsely
framed as unencumbered consumers who can freely shape their family planning
experiences through market participation and thus do not need the state’s support. The
concomitant emphasis on individual responsibility justifies a punitive state response when
a woman “fails” to navigate the contraceptive market properly and experiences an
unintended pregnancy.
Traditional arguments for equitable and enhanced contraceptive access are grounded
in claims of Constitutional rights to reproductive freedom.286 Unfortunately, this rhetoric
of individual rights, rooted in privacy jurisprudence, focuses only on restraining the state
from interfering with a woman’s reproductive decisions. It imposes no positive obligations
on the state. Instead, rhetorical focus on individual reproductive choice affirms the state’s
problematic abdication of responsibility for contraception to the marketplace and its
placement of blame for unintended pregnancy on individual women. Further, advocating
for contraception as a private individual choice fuels political and social arguments against
public funding and obscures the widespread social harm that results from inadequate access
to contraception.
286

See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Contraception as a Sex Equality Right, 124 YALE L.J.F. 349
(2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/contraception-as-a-sex-equality-right (arguing that the
Constitutional “right to contraception” is grounded in the principle of sexual equality as well as liberty);
NWLC, COVID Issue Brief, supra note 24, at 1 (“The right to access birth control is enshrined in the U.S.
Constitution and a range of state and federal laws. These legal protections are grounded in the principle that
birth control and the ability to determine if and when to have children are inextricably tied to one's
wellbeing, equality, and ability to determine the course of one's life.”); Sonfield, Fragmented System, supra
note 34, at 1 (arguing for comprehensive coverage of contraception because “[b]irth control is central to
people’s reproductive autonomy and their ability to control whether and when to become pregnant”);
Colleen P. Judge, Tierney E. Wolgemuth, Megan E. Hamm & Sonya Borrero, “Without Bodily Autonomy
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2016 U.S. Presidential Election, 96 CONTRACEPTION 370, 374 (2017) (finding that concerns of survey
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fundamental human rights and that access to affordable contraception and abortion is vital to the
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A better approach to establishing state responsibility for family planning would
reframe state involvement as proactive, positive, and supportive rather than punitive and
reactionary. Vulnerability theory offers such an approach.287 Vulnerability theory begins
with the recognition that, as embodied beings who are constantly susceptible to changes in
our physical and social well-being, we are all universally vulnerable. 288 The severely
restrained state can play only a limited role in protecting the autonomous, independent, and
self-sufficient legal subject from any constraint on the exercise of her autonomy. 289 In
contrast, vulnerability theory requires a responsive state that affirmatively addresses the
vulnerability of its subjects.290 It does so by providing its citizens with the resources needed
to maintain resilience in all life stages in a just and equitable manner.291
A vulnerability approach thus imposes positive obligations on the state to provide
contraception as a form of resilience, rather than allowing the state to abdicate
responsibility to individual women under a limited “consumer protection” role. This shifts
the focus from providing access to a minimally regulated insurance market to providing
holistic support for family planning, including the social and economic support needed to
address unintended pregnancy. This recognition allows us to move beyond the myth that
contraception is solely the product of private medical decisions made between a woman
and her provider and require the state to consider the myriad social and economic factors
influencing family planning.
The COVID-19 pandemic illustrates the need for a holistic state response. The
pandemic’s enormous financial and social impacts on all aspects of family planning
demonstrate the shortcomings of a narrow consumer-oriented approach to contraception.
The resulting economic recession has left millions without health insurance due to job loss,
particularly women.292 Further, many women have been unable to access a provider or
pharmacy to obtain contraception due to pandemic-related closures and transportation
difficulties. In a recent national survey, 33% of women experienced a delay or cancellation
of reproductive health care during the pandemic.293 It is not enough to simply ensure that
these women can make “informed” choices about health insurance and contraception when
their choices are so severely constrained.
The state made a deliberate choice to involve private insurers and cannot simply
delegate responsibility for family planning without additional oversight. The ACA
certainly did not have to tie distribution of contraception to the for-profit insurance model.
Yet rather than reviving direct public funding of contraceptive care through something like
the Title X program, 294 the ACA further delegated fulfillment of this important public
See generally Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9.
Martha Albertson Fineman, Injury in the Unresponsive State: Writing the Vulnerable Subject into NeoLiberal Legal Culture, in INJURY AND INJUSTICE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF HARM AND REDRESS 50, 58
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health responsibility to the private insurance market. So long as private insurers remain
involved in fulfilling this public responsibility, the state must closely monitor and regulate
the discretion afforded them in making public decisions regarding coverage of various
contraceptive methods.295 Further, the egregious lack of transparency in insurance practices
is not merely a matter of consumer protection. We must recognize that insurers are making
public policy when they decide to impose cost-sharing or other burdensome requirements
on a particular contraceptive or to deny medical necessity waivers for a preferred
contraceptive. Therefore, lack of enforcement and disclosure requirements inhibits the
public accountability and transparency that is crucial to democracy. The state is obligated
to act where insurers are in clear violation of existing law and to ensure that the public has
enough information to hold insurers accountable for failure to vindicate public values.
B. From Individual to Institutional
The ACA’s relentless individualism forecloses a necessary examination of the
institutional constraints motivating insurer conduct. Instead, vulnerability theory allows us
to expand beyond the autonomous individual and closely examine societal institutions.
Institutions are the central way that society provides resources to individuals, allowing
them to fulfill social roles and contribute to the healthy reproduction of society.296 Thus,
vulnerability theory requires the state to monitor and regulate the ways in which power and
privilege may be conferred unequally within social institutions and relationships.297 Under
this approach, the state is obligated to closely examine insurance practices and policies that
create significant inequities in contraceptive access.
At the same time, it is important to recognize that institutions themselves are
vulnerable to internal and external corruption and change and must be actively monitored
and updated by the state because of this vulnerability.298 Thus, the state must assess power
imbalances between insurers, providers, pharmaceutical companies, employers, and
patients. In contrast to an individualistic focus on consumer protection or reproductive
rights, a vulnerability approach allows us to consider the interests of all stakeholders,
including the insurers. Under this approach, we can examine how the state can and should
respond to the institutional, physical, social, and economic conditions that constrain
corporate and governmental behavior. It is not enough simply to increase enforcement or
enact stricter regulation. Insurers’ institutional vulnerabilities must be addressed if we
continue to make them responsible for meeting public goals. State vulnerability must also
be addressed to pave the way for meaningful solutions.
1. The Vulnerable Insurer
As private corporations, insurers are inherently vulnerable by nature of their
dependence upon profit generation.299 While managed care undoubtedly burdens access to
See Fineman, supra note 288, at 67 (“Because societal institutions are so vitally important, both to
individuals and to society, their flaws, barriers, gaps, and potential pitfalls must be monitored, and these
institutions must be adjusted when they are functioning in ways harmful to individuals and society.”).
296
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contraception, some amount of cost containment in health insurance is necessary due to the
enormous cost of health care in the U.S. This Section provides an analysis of some of the
institutional vulnerabilities that also motivate the use of cost-saving techniques.
a. Harm Caused by the ACA
By placing the responsibility for equitable contraceptive access on private insurers,
the ACA is asking them to fulfill a fundamental public health goal that is arguably
incompatible with the primary corporate obligation to maximize shareholder value. At the
same time, the state has crippled their ability to meet either of these obligations in several
ways. Scholars have noted the degree to which enactment of the ACA transformed health
insurance from a traditional risk-spreading device to a financer of care more akin to social
insurance. 300 Unfortunately, this transformation was hardly recognized, much less
supported, by the state. The ACA imposed enormous public responsibility on insurers
while failing to address the many ways in which its corresponding consumer protections
threatened insurers’ livelihoods.
First, the ACA prohibited long-standing practices of risk classification. Insurance
traditionally functions by attempting to spread risk across large groups to keep costs low.301
This inherently involves classifying individuals and groups according to risk.302 A major
goal of the ACA was to prohibit insurers from denying coverage or increasing premiums
based on individual risk classification.303 As a result, insurers are prohibited from denying
or dropping coverage because of preexisting conditions, medical history, or medical
status.304 Insurers on the individual and small-group markets are also not allowed to charge
higher premiums based on gender or health status and are prohibited from charging
significantly higher premiums based on age.305 These prohibitions were important public
health gains. They significantly increased access to insurance by disallowing the
consideration of preexisting conditions and the practice of charging women higher
premiums due to their likely need for reproductive care. However, as a result, insurers were
forced to insure a much larger segment of potentially high-risk individuals with less ability
to vary premium rates according to risk. And while the ACA imposes no upper limit on
premiums, plans cannot expect to remain competitive if they implement significant acrossthe-board premium hikes.
Second, Congress did not do enough to ensure necessary participation. It is wellrecognized that a system requiring insurers to accept anyone who applies regardless of
health status requires nearly universal participation.306 Otherwise, young healthy people
would only purchase insurance when they became sick or aged, a phenomenon known as
adverse selection.307 Self-selection of the riskiest individuals for enrollment in insurance
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plans is considered “adverse” to the insurer and marketplace.308 In such a scenario, insurers
are forced to increase premiums and other costs to meet the increased care needs of the
riskier pool.309 To combat this, the ACA originally contained an Individual Mandate, which
required most individuals to either purchase insurance or pay a penalty.310 However, after
a protracted legal and political battle, Congress effectively killed the Individual Mandate
in 2017 by reducing the penalty amount to $0. 311 Thus, healthier individuals have
significantly less incentive to participate in the insurance market, forcing insurers to spread
risk across a smaller pool.
Third, the ACA placed caps on administrative spending that could harm smaller
insurers. The ACA effectively capped insurer profits by imposing minimum medical loss
ratio (MLR) requirements.312 The MLR is the percentage of premium revenue spent on
patient care and efforts to improve the quality of patient care.313 If an insurer spends above
a certain threshold, typically 15-20% of premium revenue, on anything else (such as
administrative costs or salaries), it must issue rebates to its customers. This requirement
resulted in significant customer gains. From 2011-2017, insurers refunded $4 billion to
policyholders.314 Unfortunately, some insurers resort to unethical tactics to avoid issuing
rebates. A recent study found that approximately 14% of insurers strategically overestimate to avoid rebates, costing policyholders hundreds of millions of dollars.315 While
there is certainly no excuse for circumventing the law in this manner, the motivation to do
so may be understandable. The MLR does not just restrict “windfall profits”316 but also
restricts arguably legitimate administrative spending. Indeed, opponents of the MLR
argued vigorously that the requirement would force many insurers out of the market,
particularly small insurers, which tend to have a higher percentage of administrative
costs.317 This problem is further exacerbated by the increased expense of administering the
MLR itself.318 Thus, while some insurers may be opportunistically circumventing the law
solely to boost profits, others may simply be resorting to drastic measures to remain
solvent.
Last, the ACA required insurers to make enormous expenditures by mandating nocost coverage of preventive services. Naturally, requiring insurers to cover a host of
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310
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services, drugs, and devices without cost-sharing could impose an enormous financial
strain. While it has been argued that focusing on prevention might ultimately save money,
the evidence is mixed as to whether covering preventive services generally saves insurers
from the resulting costs of more expensive treatments down the road.319 Additionally, our
system of employment-based insurance disincentivizes this sort of long-term strategy, as a
change in employment status often triggers a change in insurer, such that the insurer
funding the preventive care may not reap the long-term benefits. 320 In sum, these
requirements are very likely to impose significant profit loss without some sort of
compensating measure.
The ACA imposed a significant financial burden upon private insurers. Requiring
insurers to cover individuals and services that they would not normally cover forces
insurers to either raise premiums, increase cost-sharing, or deny coverage elsewhere.321
Studies support this, showing a modest increase in premiums,322 significant increase in
across-the-board cost-sharing, 323 and increased narrowing of networks since
implementation of the ACA.324 Insurers can only raise premiums so much if they wish to
remain competitive and it may be difficult to reduce administrative costs or payments to
providers. Therefore, insurers must primarily rely on cost-sharing and utilization
management techniques that limit or discourage the usage of unnecessary or expensive
treatments.325
Additionally, insurers may consider merging to remain solvent, a move that could
increase consumer costs and decrease quality of care by reducing market competition.326
A prominent example of this is the 2015 attempted merger of Aetna and Humana. After
the Department of Justice moved to block the merger, the CEO of Aetna sent a letter of
intent to withdraw from the health insurance exchanges if the merger was disallowed.327
While many viewed the letter as a threat, Aetna claimed they were losing money and simply
could not afford to remain on the exchanges without additional resources. 328 The merger
was ultimately struck down in federal court on antitrust grounds, due to concern that the
Mariner, supra note 300, at 447. However, there is strong evidence that full coverage of contraception
saves money compared to the costs associated with unintended pregnancy. See James Trussell, Anjana M.
Lalla, Quan V. Doan, Eileen Reyes, Lionel Pinto & Joseph Gricar, Cost Effectiveness of Contraceptives in
the United States, 79 CONTRACEPTION 5 (2009).
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deal would lessen competition on the individual insurance marketplace and thus allow the
combined entity to raise prices or reduce benefits.329 While this decision may have been
best for patients, it is worth considering the motivations of many insurers attempting such
mergers shortly after implementation of the ACA.330 Aetna did in fact pull out of most of
the state exchanges in 2017 and completely exited all exchanges in 2018, “projecting
around $225 million in losses from its exchange plan businesses this year following a loss
of $700 million for 2014 through 2016.”331 It is certainly possible that the attempted merger
was an effort to save the business.332
Thus, while utilization management and premium increases undoubtedly burden
contraceptive access, insurers may have to use these cost-containing measures because the
state gave them enormous public responsibility without the necessary assistance.
b. Big Pharma
Rising pharmaceutical costs have been the subject of intense academic and political
scrutiny. 333 Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) especially are receiving increased
attention in this ongoing debate. Many have rightfully criticized the conflicts of interest
inherent in PBM structure that can lead to higher prices for the consumer. Foremost, PBMs
negotiate with drug manufacturers for rebates on drugs rather than negotiating for
discounted prices.334 The retrospective nature of such rebates increases the likelihood that
the cost-savings will not be passed onto the consumer.335 This is exacerbated by a marked
lack of transparency.336 Further, rebates are typically paid as a percentage of a drug’s list
price, which incentivizes PBMs to select more expensive drugs for formularies or to
encourage increased list prices.337 Evidence suggests that this incentive is reciprocal, as
manufacturers are motivated to increase drug prices to compensate for the expense of
rebates. 338 Additionally, PBMs that include pharmacies, such as CVS-Caremark, are
incentivized to steer pharmacy customers to higher-cost drugs to maximize profits.339
While all of this is cause for concern, it is also worth examining the ways in which
Reed Abelson and Leslie Picker, Judge Blocks Aetna’s $37 Billion Deal for Humana, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
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this structure leaves PBMs vulnerable to the profit-maximizing efforts of pharmaceutical
companies. First, insurers are undoubtedly impacted by the enormous cost of prescription
drugs. The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most profitable in the nation,340 with profit
margins that far exceed those of the health insurance industry.341 High drug prices are often
justified by the need for innovation. However, many have criticized this rationale,
particularly where evidence suggests they are spending more on advertising than on
research and development. 342 Additionally, some companies spend more on stock
buybacks, dividends, and executive compensation than research and development. 343
Recently, Congressional committee members questioned a pharmaceutical CEO’s
rationale for increasing the price of its top-selling drug Humira to a whopping $77,000 per
annual supply.344 Noting the CEO’s own $24 million annual salary and the $50 billion
spent on stock buybacks and dividends in a five-year period, Representative Katie Porter
confronted the CEO about the “Big Lie”:
You're spending all this money to make sure you make money rather than
spending money to invest in [and] develop drugs and help patients with
affordable, lifesaving drugs . . . . You lie to patients when you charge them
twice as much for an unimproved drug, and then you lie to policymakers
when you tell us that [research and development (R&D)] justifies those
price increases . . . . The Big Pharma fairy tale is one of groundbreaking
R&D that justifies astronomical prices. But the pharma reality is that you
spend most of your company's money-making money for yourself and your
shareholders.345
Pharmaceutical companies place additional pressure on insurers by creating patient
demand for expensive drugs through a combination of coupon programs and direct-toconsumer advertising. First, drug manufacturers issue coupons to patients to try their
products at sharply discounted rates, but unbeknownst to the patient and the prescribing
physician, the patient’s insurer may not cover the cost of the drug once refills are needed.346
Professor Michelle Mello recounted her story of receiving a coupon from a physician for
her son to try Auvi-Q, an alternative to the popular epinephrine product EpiPen, at no
cost.347 After learning that the no-cost program was limited to three refills, she contacted
her insurer to determine her future out-of-pocket costs.348 With some difficulty, she was
able to ascertain that her out-of-pocket costs would be a jaw-dropping $13,500 for three
Michelle M. Mello, What Makes Ensuring Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs the Hardest Problem
in Health Policy?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2273, 2282 (2018).
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packs.349 Because her PBM received only a 2.35% discount on the enormous list price of
$4394.10 per pack (versus $554.95 for EpiPen), they could not cover Auvi-Q without a
physician’s determination that cheaper forms of epinephrine were contraindicated. 350
Professor Mello noted that these patient coupon programs “have driven a wedge between
the perceived interests of patients and those of their health plans. They are highly effective
in inducing prescriptions for branded drugs: in one study, they increased branded-drug
sales by 60%, with commensurate reductions in sales of generic drugs.”351 Additionally,
pharmaceutical companies engage in direct-to-consumer advertising to induce patients to
request certain drugs from their physicians. This type of advertising, legal in only one other
country besides the U.S., creates enormous conflict. 352 Physicians may prescribe these
drugs because they are unaware of drug cost or the details of a patient’s insurance
coverage353 or because they fear they will lose the patient to another doctor if they do not
comply.354 Insurers, in turn, face pressure from physicians and patients to cover the oftenexorbitant cost of these brand-name drugs.
The combination of high drug prices and promotional efforts poses a significant
threat to insurers. Insurers face substantial pressure to pay the asking price when confronted
with increased consumer demand for an expensive drug. This is particularly true for drugs
that have no competition, limiting the ability of insurers to bargain with manufacturers.355
To combat unregulated drug prices, the PBM industry has undergone a series of highly
criticized mergers, shrinking the market from "at least ten significant competitors" in 2012
to the top three PBMs controlling approximately 70% of revenues in the PBM market in
2017.356 As PBMs often serve multiple insurance plans, consolidation necessarily increases
their ability to negotiate prices with drug manufacturers and pharmacies. Evidence
confirms that these negotiations, particularly selective contracting with pharmacies, have
lowered drug costs.357
The focus on PBM mega-mergers and perverse incentives to inflate drug prices once
again exemplifies the tension between private profit and public health. We cannot delegate
responsibility for financing pharmaceutical costs to private insurers and expect them not to
engage in profit-maximizing behaviors. Undoubtedly, the state should regulate these
behaviors and take significant steps to increase transparency. However, the state must also
recognize the enormous financial burden imposed upon PBMs by pharmaceutical
companies.
c. Medical Providers
While insurers often look like the villains in frequent disputes with medical
providers,358 it is important to remember that insurers are highly dependent upon medical
349
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providers to contain costs. Providers can threaten profits in several ways. Providers
sometimes inflate costs by engaging in the practice of offensive medicine, providing excess
care to maximize reimbursement.359 Further, malpractice insurers and medical institutions
may encourage the use of defensive medicine, providing potentially unnecessary care to
avoid legal liability. 360 According to one source, defensive medicine alone has been
estimated to cost as much as $46 billion each year in the U.S.361
Importantly, managed care thrives on the contractual relationship between providers
and insurers, wherein providers offer discounted rates in exchange for referrals. Research
shows that this selective contracting has lowered the cost of health care for both insurers
and patients.362 Insurers may struggle to keep costs low if providers refuse to negotiate
reasonable reimbursement rates. For example, USAP, a large group of anesthesiologists,
recently filed two state lawsuits against UnitedHealthcare, accusing the insurer of using
“unlawful tactics” to divert business from them after an ongoing rate dispute. 363 A
UnitedHealthcare spokesperson countered that the lawsuits were an effort to pressure them
into agreeing to USAP’s egregious rate demands, which were “double the median rate paid
to other anesthesiology groups in Texas and 70% higher than the median for similar groups
in Colorado.”364 This case illustrates the continuous tension between profit-driven health
care entities. Providers are not always single physicians acting in the best interests of
patients. Hospitals and medical practices can be enormous profit-generating machines,
employing the same questionable business tactics for which insurers are criticized and
threatening insurers’ solvency.
d. The Cost of Transparency
Lastly, it is worth noting that the transparency required to vindicate public values
comes at a cost to private entities. First, collecting and preparing information for disclosure
increases costs. In the case of PBMs, “[t]he FTC has acknowledged that additional
disclosure ‘will increase heath care costs, and such costs may be reflected in the price of
drug plans that health plans are able to offer . . . , the scope of coverage consumers receive
providers out of business by exclusively contracting with other providers. See Lien, supra note 326, at 136
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brought by providers against insurers for improper claims processing procedures that, inter alia, reduce
provider reimbursement).
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under such plans, or the number of consumers who have access to such coverage.’”365
Additionally, as with all private entities, public disclosure of sensitive information may
reduce bargaining power. For example, PBMs may lose their ability to negotiate with
pharmacies and drug manufacturers for discounts if all contract terms are made public.366
In the worst-case scenario, this increased transparency could “foster tacit [price] collusion
among drug makers.”367 Similarly, disclosure could harm competition amongst PBMs for
contracts with health plans. 368 Again, there is an inherent tension in requiring private
entities to meet public expectations. This tension must be recognized and addressed by the
state.
2. The Vulnerable State
While this Article is focused primarily on regulation of insurers, it should be noted
that the state’s current approach to contraceptive access is also highly unjust. The
patchwork of contraception laws that vary by insurance status causes vast inequities. Laws
vary between those who have insurance and those who do not, those on private versus
public insurance, those on Medicaid managed care versus fee-for-service, and those on
Medicaid by way of ACA expansion versus “regular” Medicaid. Of course, contraceptive
access varies dramatically by state of residence. First, state contraceptive and insurance
regulation laws differ significantly. Second, state Medicaid programs vary in the products
and services covered. Third, states vary in the amount of information and assistance
provided in obtaining insurance through the ACA marketplace. If Georgia’s Medicaid
waiver is allowed to stand, states will also vary in whether they even offer a marketplace
for private insurance for those not covered by an employer. Fourth, states that have not
expanded Medicaid leave millions in the uninsured “Medicaid gap,” burdening
contraceptive access. Lastly, state enforcement of improper contraceptive coverage denial
varies in both practice and policy.
This fragmented system of regulation is the result of the state’s vulnerability to
capture and corruption by corporations and special interest groups. Insurers and
pharmaceutical companies exercise enormous lobbying power. 369 They were extremely
influential in the drafting of the ACA, first launching campaigns to defeat health care
reform entirely, then helping to defeat single-payer and public options. 370 The
pharmaceutical industry spent over $185 million to prevent the incorporation of drug price
controls into the ACA.371 State insurance commissioners are also vulnerable to capture.
Insurance companies donate to the campaigns of state governors who will appoint
commissioners that may serve their interests.372 Many of these state regulators are former
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employees of insurers who may return to working with insurers in the future.373 As a result,
state regulators routinely “rubber stamp” policy forms and rarely exercise authority to
reject inadequate language in policy documents. 374 It is easy to see how this lax
enforcement could extend to improper denials of contraceptive coverage.
Additionally, the state is vulnerable to ideological capture. This Article has detailed
several ways in which anti-regulatory and federalist ideologies undermine fulfillment of
public health obligations. Individual state leaders, motivated by political desire to
undermine the ACA, have prevented access to insurance, and thus contraception, in
numerous ways, exposing the federal government’s vulnerability to “obstructive
federalism.” Actions of the Trump administration to promote health plans that circumvent
the ACA and expand religious exemption demonstrate the state’s vulnerability to the
ideologies of its leader. In sum, a comprehensive approach to contraception requires us to
also recognize our collective responsibility for monitoring and democratically correcting
the state.
C. Responsive Solutions
The primary aim of this Article is not to provide concrete solutions but rather to
reimagine the theoretical underpinnings of state involvement in family planning. However,
there are several possible steps the responsive state could take to better ensure
contraceptive equity.
Obviously, decoupling contraception distribution from private insurance coverage
would free women from burdensome and inequitable profit-motivated restrictions. This
decoupling could be accomplished by offering contraception through a nationalized singlepayer public insurance program or a significantly expanded Title X program. Barring that,
the federal government should codify firmer protections against restrictive insurer tactics.
Ideally, insurers would be prohibited from imposing any cost-sharing or utilization
management techniques on a specific contraceptive unless there is a therapeutic equivalent.
This would ensure free access to a much wider range of options. At the very least, the
“category rule,” which clarifies that insurers must cover at no-cost at least one method in
each FDA-defined birth control category, should be codified to ensure that it cannot be
easily altered by future administrations. The federal government should also address
restrictive quantity limits by requiring insurers to cover a single provision of several
months’ supply of contraception. It would also be beneficial to require coverage of male
contraceptives as well as OTC and pharmacy prescribed methods. However, it should be
clear that the state cannot simply prohibit insurers from using their remaining costcontaining methods without addressing some of their many institutional vulnerabilities. It
is beyond the scope of this Article to propose such a holistic solution, but the need must be
acknowledged.
The state could take several steps to increase transparency and accountability. The
ACA was a good start, imposing promising new disclosure requirements on individual
marketplace plans. Importantly, those plans are now required to report the number of
claims denied. Expanding these requirements to employer-sponsored plans would be
governors who, in turn, appoint the insurance commissioners responsible for reviewing proposed mergers).
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extremely beneficial. Additionally, the state should require insurers to submit more detailed
information on cost-sharing and denials of contraception claims (and really all claims
involving mandatory coverage of preventive health services). Mandatory reporting of
appeals decisions would also help to hold insurers accountable for improper claim denials.
The federal government should require insurers to use a standard waiver form and process
to expedite waiver of cost-sharing when a physician determines that a particular
contraceptive is “medically necessary,” a step that has already been taken in at least one
state.375 The state should take further steps to expand this exemption beyond individual
medical needs, recognizing the many social and economic factors that influence
contraception choice, including physical location. Additionally, there should be greater
oversight of state insurance commissions and a mass information campaign to encourage
investigation and enforcement of improper claim denials at the agency level. ERISA’s
burdensome and piecemeal enforcement process is simply insufficient to ensure mass
compliance with such important public health requirements.
CONCLUSION
Unintended pregnancy is a social problem suffering from an individualistic and
privatized “solution.” The ACA’s contraceptive mandate made important gains in fulfilling
public responsibility for contraception, but too much of the implementation is left to the
discretion of private insurers and too much of the enforcement burden is placed on
individual women. We must move beyond our narrow consumer-oriented approach to
contraception. Contraception is vital to fulfillment of important social obligations, not a
choice made by empowered consumers. Unintended pregnancy is not a personal failure but
a social one. Rather than continuing to focus on individual choice and individual
responsibility, vulnerability theory properly places responsibility with the state to provide
contraception as a form of resilience. This responsibility extends to all stages of societal
reproduction. The state is obligated to provide economic and social support for adequate
family planning as well as for pregnancies that result from their failure to meet this
obligation. Further, if the state continues to make private insurers responsible for meeting
public health goals, it must also address the institutional vulnerabilities of insurers resulting
from the enormous tension between private profit and public health that the state has
imposed. Only in this manner will we be closer to achieving true contraceptive equity under
our existing market-based approach to public health.

At least one state, New York, has required insurers to use a standard, easy-to-understand waiver form
developed by a state agency. NWLC, Exception Policies, supra note 115, at 4.
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